67 



Smyth of Princeton, the report was released to avert any misconcep- 

 tion or wild speculation by the public concerning the new weapon. 

 Moreover, it v as hoped that by supplying a substantial amount of in- 

 formation at this time, the report would alleviate public pressure, espe- 

 cially from the scientific community, for release of all pertinent infor- 

 mation. The Smyth report supplied basic facts, but not enough to aid 

 rival efforts to develop an atomic weapon. 17 



The decision to release the Smyth report was much debated within 

 the Administration, but the reasons noted above prevailed. The Smyth 

 report was later used as a basic source for the discussions in a Scien- 

 tific and Technical Committee of the UNAEC. The conclusion of the 

 report is often cited when the study is considered in relation to inter- 

 national control : 



We find ourselves with an explosive which is far from 

 completely perfected. Yet the future possibilities of such 

 explosives are appalling, and their effects on future wars and 

 international affairs are of fundamental importance. Here is 

 a new tool for mankind, a tool of unimaginable destructive 

 power. Its development raises many questions that must be 

 answered in the near future. 



* * * These questions are not technical questions ; they are 

 political and social questions, and the answers given to them 

 may affect all mankind for generations * * * In a free country 

 like ours, such questions should be debated by the people and 

 decisions must be made by the people through their repre- 

 sentatives. This is one reason for the release of this report. It 

 is a semi-technical report which it is hoped men of science in 

 this country can use to help their fellow citizens in reaching 

 wise decisions. The people of the country must be informed 

 if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely. 18 



Among the initial public statements of U.S. policy on arrangements 

 for international control was President Truman's address to Congress 

 on October 3, 1945. Affirming the U.S. commitment to seek interna- 

 tional control of atomic energy and the U.S. desire to share informa- 

 tion for peaceful purposes, the President announced the impending 

 discussions with Canada and Great Britain which were to result in the 

 Three Nation Agreed Declaration. On October 27, 1945, he further 

 defined U.S. policy by enunciating five basic principles which, for 

 the most part, had originated with Stimson's committee. These con- 

 clusions might be viewed as a combination of the primary technological 

 and political factors which would condition the evolution of the U.S. 

 plan for international control and the negotiations to achieve such 

 control. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, associated with early U.S. arms con- 

 trol negotiations in the Department of State, has summarized these 

 principles as follows : 



1. No nation can long maintain a monopoly of atomic 

 weapons. 



2. No nation could long maintain or morally defend a 

 monopoly of peaceful benefits of atomic energy. 



17 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar B. Anderson, Jr. The New World 1939/191,6, A History 

 of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. I (University Park, Pa. : Pennsyl- 

 vania State University Press, 1962) pp. 400-407. 



18 Smyth, General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for 

 Military Purposes, p. 165. 



