81 



logical premise that the processes associated with the development of 

 atomic energy, whether for military or peaceful purposes, "are in 

 much of their course interchangeable and interdependent." Because of 

 this factor, it was considered necessary under a control arrangement to 

 monitor each stage in the process of developing atomic energy, from 

 raw materials to finished product, to insure that the materials were 

 not diverted at some point in the process to weapons development by 

 an individual nation. Such a comprehensive inspection system would 

 take a great number of inspectors; moreover, the inspectors would be 

 called upon to determine intent behind an operation associated with 

 atomic energy development. The Consultants asserted that "at no 

 single point can external control of an operation be sufficiently reliable 

 to be an adequate sole safeguard." 51 



Another technological argument against inspection concerned the 

 need for technical expertise in the staff which monitored atomic energy 

 activities. To determine the existence of violations, staff members of 

 an inspectorate would have to be highly trained in the field of atomic 

 energy development. Moreover, the organization would have to be 

 involved in research and development activities to keep abreast or 

 ahead of advanced and changing developments, in a field which is "es- 

 sentially a living art." Otherwise, would-be violators might try to 

 exploit breakthroughs if they discovered them first. According to the 

 Board of Consultants, an inspection system would "inevitably be slow 

 to take into account changes in the science and technology of the 

 field." 52 



The remainder of the remarks against inspection in the Acheson- 

 Lilienthal report seem to be derived from the "political, social, and 

 organizational problems" of a control system, rather than from the 

 technological requirements. The Consultants asserted that an inspec- 

 tion system having a generally policelike character, would be deemed 

 negative and suppressive. This quality would have a number of ill 

 effects on the control system and its personnel. First, it would be diffi- 

 cult to attract highly qualified personnel in the field of atomic energy 

 to an inspection team having this character, and the team itself would 

 encounter problems in morale. Second, because inspection of facilities 

 would require a large number of inspectors, the presence of many for- 

 eigners in participating countries would intrude excessively into na- 

 tional activities, challenge the good faith of the nations, and provide 

 a likely source of tension and friction. On this particular point, the 

 Consultants declared that this arrangement would be "as obnoxious to 

 Americans as to any others." 53 Finally, the Consultants contended, un- 

 der a system which entrusted atomic energy development to individual 

 nations, "suspicion by one nation of the good faith of another and the 

 fear engendered thereby are themselves strong incentives for the first 

 to embark on secret illicit operations [and] any system based on out- 

 lawing the purely military development of atomic energy and relying 

 solely on inspection for enforcement would at the outset be surrounded 

 by conditions which would destroy the system." 54 Indeed, a basic 

 source of the problem associated with inspection, according to the 



51 Ibid., p. 6. 



52 Ibid. 



53 Ibid., p. 7. 



54 Ibid., p. 8. 



