86 



ities, which might involve the International Court of Justice or some 

 similar body, to determine if enough evidence of clandestine activity 

 existed to warrant investigation. 68 



The report stressed that operation of dangerous activities by the 

 proposed international Authority could eliminate the need for deter- 

 mination of intent behind national or private facilities, and would 

 thereby avoid the need for extensive and intrusive inspection. In addi- 

 tion, the following statement regarding some of the technical diffi- 

 culties of engaging in clandestine activities seemed to minimize not 

 only the need for inspection but also, perhaps, the possibility that 

 evasions might be attempted : 



It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of 

 the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable 

 burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may, 

 by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific 

 detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult. 

 Hut the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to 

 the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a 

 scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation 

 to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult 

 undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort 

 should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence 

 of the effort rather than a specific purpose or motive or plan 

 which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger sig- 

 nal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the pro- 

 posals we have outlined. 60 



REACTIONS AMONG U.S. POLICYMAKERS TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE BOARD 



OF CONSULTANTS 



When the Board originally presented its plan to Achesoirs commit- 

 tee, both Conant and Groves voiced apprehension that the need for 

 inspection had been minimized too much and that the terms which 

 the Consultants used to characterize it were too negative. Conant con- 

 sidered it vital that there be freedom of access for inspectors. At one 

 point McCloy raised the possibility that this plan might be one way 

 "'to alter Russia's closed society.'' 70 But Acheson discouraged the idea 

 on the grounds that the basic political issues associated with the diffi- 

 culties in United States-Soviet relations could not be resolved through 

 the efforts to deal with the problem of international control of atomic 

 energy. Although Lilienthal agreed readily to make changes appropri- 

 ate to the views of Conant and Groves, the report's general tone on the 

 issue of inspection remained negat ive. 



Despite the fact that the Board had retained the idea of some na- 

 tional activity, significant forces at work in the policymaking proc- 

 ess opposed extensive internationalization, for technical and other 



98 For a discussion of Inspection, sop State Department, "Acheson-Lillenthal Report", 

 pp. 35 39. 



•"Ibid., pp. 36 ':t The Board seems t<> have given little thought to the possible emer 

 gence <>f an international black market in fissionable materials, an issue that is attracting 

 considerable attention todaj as the United states and other governments push ahead with 



die development "i i>r ler reader technology, which can greatly increase the amount "i 



fissionable material available for direct use in weapons manufacture, Today it' a nation or 

 other institutions can obtain nuclear materials en q black market, it is probable that such 

 an instrumentality could fabricate small, inefficient, but still enormously destructive 



at Iininhs. 



7 " Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United Stairs Atomic Energy Commxxsion, 

 p. 548. 



