87 



reasons. The issue of ownership of raw materials is an apt example. 

 Searls, the mining engineer on Baruch's delegation, did not share the 

 Consultants' view regarding the manageability of all the sources of 

 raw materials, and advised Baruch that the arrangement proposed in 

 the Acheson-Lilienthal report would be difficult. His views were sec- 

 onded by representatives of mining interests who sought out Baruch 

 to argue against international ownership. One mining executive told 

 Baruch "an international administration would upset wages, dissat- 

 isfy people, and, on account of the different nationals involved, present 

 tremendous management difficulties." 71 



Another argument against international ownership was that it vio- 

 lated the rights of private enterprise. Hancock, of Baruch's group, 

 contended that if uranium was the byproduct of mining operations 

 which contributed significantly to a country's economy, international 

 ownership would be unacceptable to that country. At one meeting, 

 when Hancock expressed his preference for more inspection over own- 

 ership, Acheson pointed out that the Russians would not accept this 

 arrangement as the predominant safeguard. Hancock disagreed, and 

 the two men did not resolve the issue. 72 An alternative plan called for 

 operation of nationally owned mines under "reasonable regulations" 

 of the Authority or "a system of rigorous inspection and accounting 

 procedures for the separation operations at mining locations through- 

 out the world." Baruch's team was willing to support this position 

 against international ownership. 73 When Baruch met with the Ache- 

 son and Lilienthal groups, he announced the delegation's preference 

 for "some form of licensing of private mining operations" and sug- 

 gested using the term "dominion" to describe the relationship between 

 the international Authority and raw materials. 74 Apparently, the tech- 

 nological assertions which were advanced to support the Consultants' 

 proposals for ownership of raw materials were insufficient for the 

 United States to overcome traditional political and economic concepts 

 of sovereignty and private ownership. The varying assertions by the 

 qualified experts on the manageability of raw materials compounded 

 the confusion surrounding the problem of atomic energy control. In 

 retrospect, a more important factor was the discovery of uranium 

 in the years following the negotiations in places where it was not 

 anticipated in 1946. 



TREND TOWARD CONTROL IN U.S. POLICY 



As enunciated at the negotiations, the main thrust of U.S. policy on 

 the general form of control shifted somewhat from the plan proposed 

 in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In describing the international Au- 

 thority, Baruch's speech to the UNAEC offered a variety of specific 

 methods of control over various phases of atomic energy development. 

 Among the safeguards he proposed were "various forms of ownership, 

 dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and manage- 

 ment." 70 While Baruch stated that these duties should interfere as 

 little as possible with the internal affairs of the states involved, every 

 phase of atomic energy development would be placed under the juris- 



71 Ibid., p. 563. 



72 Ibid., p. 569. 



73 Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 276. 



74 Ibid., p. 281. 



75 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1060. 



