90 



cussion was premised on the assertion that it was not possible to main- 

 tain security by allowing nations or individuals to have proprietary 

 rights over source materials, nuclear fuels, or dangerous facilities. It 

 recognized the need to protect certain rights of individual nations 

 and to guard against any abuse of power by the international Agency. 

 Ownership by the Agency would be "in the sense of a trust exercised 

 on behalf of signatory States jointly." While broad powers over the 

 materials and facilities would be granted to the Agency as owner, 

 many of these, especially those dealing with ''rights of disposition." 

 would be '"very closely controlled by the terms of the treaty or conven- 

 tion." Certain arrangements, for example, the location of facilities 

 within a country or compensation for source materials, would have to 

 be determined through agreement with individual nations. Other ac- 

 tivities would be executed by the Agency in accordance with the prin- 

 ciples established by treaty for governing the Agency's rights and 

 duties as "trustee." 



Similarly, the report proposed that the treaty or convention deter- 

 mine principles respecting the geographic distribution of production 

 facilities and stockpiles of materials suitable for weapons use ; these 

 principles would be such that no particular location would have a 

 greater share of materials, and thus would avoid the potential for a 

 military capability or military superiority. It was decided that the 

 Agency could not be allowed to determine policy on this subject as 

 decisions in this area affected world security. 83 Thus, the UNAEC en- 

 visioned that decisions on political considerations arising from the 

 rights, duties, and limitations of international ownership would be 

 agreed to before assumption by the Authority of the powers entrusted 

 to it. 



In additional sections of the second UNAEC report, these and other 

 concepts were developed in considerable detail ; specific proposals dealt 

 with the mining of raw materials and with dangerous activities. Dis- 

 cussion of "dangerous activities'' offered proposals on the refining of 

 raw materials; the stockpiling, production, and distribution of nuclear 

 fuels; and the design, construction, and operation of isotope separa- 

 tion plants and of nuclear reactors. 



These later sections of the report contained several observations with 

 regard to arrangements with individual nations which the Authority 

 would have to make, some of which might have to be included in the 

 treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The need for such 

 arrangements was recognized, as certain activities of the Authority 

 might a licet the economy of a nation or might otherwise warrant com 

 pensation by the Authority. The report also listed the various forms of 

 inspection and licensing activities and where they would be required. 

 Although these proposals in the second UNAEC report were based 

 primarily on technological considerations, they also involved political 

 factors, as reflected in the prescription that : 



Production facilities, facilities utilizing nuclear fuel, and 

 stockpiles be distributed in such a way as to minimize the 

 possibility that seizure could provide an aggressor with a 

 militarv advantage. 84 



*> United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "The International Control of Atomic 

 Energy. The Second Report • • ♦ to the Security Council.- Sept. 11. 1047. Reproduced for 

 the United Nations Mission to the United Nations. U.N. Document S/557, Mimeo L>e« 

 York United Nations, 1047), pp. 13 17. 



"Ibid., p. 3 



