84 



ciples to support this idea are expressed in terms which hardly could 

 be considered scientific or technological : 



While suppression is not possible where we are dealing 

 with the quest for knowledge, this thirst to know (that can- 

 not be ''policed" out of existence) can be used, affirmatively, 

 in the design and building of an effective system of safe- 

 guards. 



Human history shows that any effort to confine the inquir- 

 ing human mind * * * is doomed to failure. * * * Like the 

 jiu jitsu wrestler whose skill consists in making his opponent 

 disable himself with his own thrusts, the designers of a sys- 

 tem of safeguards for security should and can utilize for en- 

 forcement measures that driving force toward knowledge 

 that is part of man's very nature. 59 



Retention of "safe" national activities : The Consultants recognized 

 that a complete monopoly of atomic energy activities by an inter- 

 national Authority would not be acceptable politically or economically. 

 Therefore, based on the existing technical knowledge, certain types 

 of activities were classified as "safe" and Mould be allowed to remain 

 in national hands. The judgment that such activities could be retained 

 safely on a national level relied primarily on a technological assump- 

 tion that "denaturing" of atomic fuel was possible. The Consultants 

 asserted that fissionable materials could be contaminated in such a 

 way that they would "not readily lend themselves to the making of 

 atomic explosives, but they can still be used with no essential loss of 

 effectiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy." 60 Re- 

 versal of the denaturing process, to make the materials suitable for 

 weapons production, was thought to involve a difficult and easily de- 

 tectable effort. 



Using denatured materials, the Consultants declared, nations could 

 puisne a number of legitimate activities, such as the operation of re- 

 search reactors (kept below a certain power level), construction and 

 operation of reactors to produce radioactive materials, and construc- 

 tion and operation of reactors to generate electric power. For these 

 activities to be entrusted to national hands, designs would have to be 

 devised for reactors which could not be diverted to dangerous use. The 

 denatured materials and operation of these activities would have to 

 be licensed or controlled in some way by the international Authority. 

 In discussing the Authority's licensing functions under which national 

 activities would operate, the Consultants raised the following 

 questions : 



How shall control be exercised lightly enough to assure the 

 free play of national and private enterprise without risk to 

 security? I low shall facilities and materials available for 

 national and private exploitation 1m> allocated and at what 

 cosl '. How may safe activities, assigned to national hands, be 

 withdrawn if new discoveries show them to be dangerous? 61 



The entire discussion of national activities in the Acheson-Lilienthal 

 report would seem to imply that the Consultants envisioned and sup- 

 ported rather active national programs in atomic energy development. 

 These activities would be of a sufficient scale and variety to encourage 



m Ibid., p. 15. 



00 Ibid . p. 2\\. 

 81 Ibid., p. 35. 



