112 



during World War II. 147 The question of how this particular ex- 

 planation of Soviet actions at that time might have justified Soviet 

 foreign policy in general is a political problem beyond the scope of this 

 study. Still, it may be worth noting that this observation, as a pos- 

 sible explanation of Soviet expansionism, has been offered to account 

 for Soviet rejection of certain elements of the Baruch plan. 148 In the 

 Soviet view, these proposed arrangements would have made the Soviet 

 Union vulnerable by admitting foreig] rs to the Soviet Union in posi- 

 tions of authority. Apart from the ideological trauma of this foreign 

 penetration, their presence might enable potential enemies of the 

 Soviets to detect sources of strength to attack and evidences of weak- 

 ness to exploit. On the other hand, if the United States had recog- 

 nized Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence, the same 

 argument continues, this gesture may have represented enough of a 

 concession by the West to contribute to obtaining a Soviet concession : 

 modification of its stand on the presence of foreign inspectors. To 

 some extent, a certain amount of outside inspection probably would 

 have been necessary for effective control, and obviously a change in 

 the Soviet position was essential to reaching agreement. 149 



SOVIET CALCULATION' OF U.S. POSITION 



The Soviet Union's calculation of the motives of the United States 

 probably encountered uncertainty with regard to the place which 

 atomic weapons held in the overall defense posture of the United 

 States. While the Soviets had retained their large forces of manpower 

 following the war, the United States had undergone rapid demobili- 

 zation of its armies. The extent of U.S. dependence on the atomic bomb, 

 and thus any demonstration of its willingness to relinquish it. were 

 governed by basic U.S. security considerations. In turn, the fact that 

 the atomic weapon had become such an integral part of the U.S. de- 

 fense posture only complicated its own efforts to devise an equitable 

 policy on a system of international control without jeopardizing U.S. 

 or world security. Indeed, Bechhoefer points out that "By January 

 1947 * * * it had been ascertained that * * * United States de- 

 mobilization had reached the stage where Soviet acceptance | of the 

 U.S. plan] would leave the United States naked." Bechhoefer be- 

 lieves this might account for l.S. failure to explain t ransitional stages 

 in detail, including the stage for elimination of the bomb, although 

 he does not explicitly question the sincerity of U.S. motives. 1 ™ 



The principle behind the declarations by the United States that it 

 would hold atomic energy in a "sacred trust" in the absence of inter- 

 national control raises an additional point which might explain Soviet 

 skepticism toward the U.S. plan. This point concerns the moral force 

 which US. officials attached to their pronouncements bearing on the 

 U.S. position in the negotiations. It would seem that merely by stat- 

 ing its aims and responsibilities in atomic energy, these officials may 

 have expected other count lies to accept the U.S. pledges without ques- 

 tion. For example, during a policy discussion of stages, Acheson's re- 



147 Lieberman. The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, j> 402. 

 " s [bid., p. 404. 



"" iMii , p mi Lieberman'a Interpretation Is, however, o hypothesis which it is impos- 

 Bible id prove or disprove nl tin- present time. 

 uo Bechhoefer, Postwar Vegotiationa, p. 11. 





