215 



Ispra in Italy where about one-third of Euratonrs own research was 

 concentrated. 



The French continued to criticize Euratom's research. They opposed 

 research on the enriched fuel technology favored in the United States, 

 arguing that there was little future for expansion of the European 

 nuclear industry if its power plants would have to depend upon the 

 United States for fuel. As an alternative, France offered to put infor- 

 mation and experience of its own nuclear power technology at the 

 disposal of the Community. This was the first time such as offer had 

 been made, and some observers questioned whether it was seriously 

 meant. 199 



The issue of which reactor technology to choose became so con- 

 troversial that it went to the Euratom Council for decision when 

 Euratom requested a $38 million increase in funding to carry out the 

 plan. The French and Belgians lined up in favor of a few projects that 

 would concentrate on natural uranium reactors, breeder reactors, and 

 fusion. Other members agreed that this concentration would be help- 

 ful, but not at the expense of a major revision of the ongoing Euratom 

 research. In a final compromise, the Council allocated an additional 

 $5.6 million for the five-year plan. Research for "proven-type" reactors, 

 a term which meant the U.S. -type reactors, was cut 20 percent. 



FAILURE TO ADOPT A THIRD 5 -YEAR PLAN 



Although Euratom's third 5-year plan for research was scheduled 

 to start in 1968, by September 1967 the dissension had become so great 

 that Euratom abandoned hope for agreement. Instead, Fritz Hellwig, 

 the Common Market commissioner responsible for Euratom research, 

 proposed a one year "transitional program," which was adopted as a 

 stopgap measure, but funded at half the 1967 level. As Euratom en- 

 tered 1968 it faced this severe cut in research funds, aimed particularly 

 at contract research, as well as isolation from the mainstream of nu- 

 clear development in Europe. The national nuclear industries did not 

 want Euratom working on technology that was ripe for commercial 

 application. That year saw repeated debates about Euratom in the 

 EEC Council, as representatives of the major members questioned the 

 practicability of a true nuclear energy community. More specifically, 

 they asked what kind of research Euratom should sponsor to win 

 support of member states. Could Euratom be an effective future force 

 for building an integrated European nuclear energy industry? No 

 clear answers emerged and the decision on the future of Euratom re- 

 search was tabled. 200 



The delay and dissension led Commissioner Hellwig to warn Eura- 

 tom that its members either had to work out a joint, long-range pro- 

 gram of research or forfeit all hope of getting into the nuclear power 

 race. He warned too that prolongation of the Euratom budget crisis 

 would jeopardize plans for a Common Market research policy. 201 



The crisis went to the European Parliament. By unanimous resolu- 

 tion it observed that the European nuclear community needed common 



1OT Michael Palmer, John Lambert and others. A Handbook of European Organizations 

 (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 19GS). p. 305. 



200 Nuclear Industry, vol. 15 (January, 196S), p. 20. 



201 Nucleonics Week, vol. 9 (October 24, 196S) , p. 8. 



