166 



Within prudent security considerations, we propose to make available to the 

 peoples of such friendly nations as are prepared to invest their own funds in 

 power reactors, access to and training in the technological processes of construc- 

 tion and operation for peaceful purposes. 



By the end of 1955, several countries had initiated negotiations in 

 response to this invitation. Early in 1956, negotiations were concluded 

 with the governments of Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 

 for the iirst bilateral agreements for power reactor projects. The agree- 

 ments provided for the transfer of Restricted Data 74 and special nu- 

 clear materials. They also provided for sale of nuclear fuel materials 

 to each country, with the United States retaining an option to the plu- 

 tonium produced and the right to approve the transfer of such pluto- 

 nium to any other nation or to an international organization if the 

 United States decided not to exercise its option. Additionally, subject 

 to limitations of available space, facilities, and personnel, the United 

 States and its bilateral partners agreed to open their specialized nu- 

 clear research facilities to each other. 



The first bilateral agreement for nuclear power development also 

 opened the way for direct relations between representatives of the U.S. 

 nuclear industry and private individuals and organizations in the 

 cooperating nations, thus removing the AEC as a direct participant in 

 commercial dealings. Other provisions of the bilateral arrangements 

 provided for: 75 



(1) Patent arrangements covering inventions or discoveries 

 resulting from the exchange of Restricted Data; 



(2) Security and safeguards arrangements to protect classified 

 information and equipment and nuclear materials; 



(3) Future consultation about transfer of rights or responsibil- 

 ities of the agreement, particularly those relating to safeguards 

 to the International Atomic Energy as might be mutually agreed 

 upon, and 



(4) Disclaiming of any warranty by the communicating Party 

 on the accuracy and completeness of information, material, equip- 

 ment or devices transferred under the agreement and of its suit- 

 ability for any particular use or application. 



74 At that time exchange of Restricted Data was significant, for much of nuclear power 

 technology was still classified ami unavailable In open literature. The Restricted Data to 

 lie exchanged Included: (1) general Information on research reactors, experimental and 

 demonstration power reactors; (2) technical Information as mighl lie agreed upon for 

 specific research ami demonstration power reactors; and (3) the exchange of classified 

 information on reactor materials, specifications, physics and engineering, and also of 

 environmental safety information. Restricted Data of military Significance were not to be 

 exch.i aged. 



" It should he noted that this disclaimer was also used by the UISAEC for information, 

 materials, devices, services, etc., that It supplied to the domestic nuclear Industry and 

 so was not unique to the bilateral agreements. 



