172 



States. These factors, in turn, have limited the market of the U.S. 

 nuclear fuel reprocessors and also have kept in Europe the radioactive 

 wastes associated with the used fuels. 



AUTHORITY FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR 



PRODUCTS AND ASSISTANCE 



Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, private firms of the infant 

 U.S. nuclear industry could not deal directly with potential customers 

 in Europe but had to work through the AEC. This cumbersome proc- 

 ess was not suited to the promotional attitude of the U.S. industry. 

 Soon after revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, the AEC an- 

 nounced a general authorization to American firms and individuals 

 to engage in any unclassified atomic energy activity with friendly 

 countries without having to obtain prior AEC approval. This au- 

 thorization greatly simplified cooperation between the domestic nu- 

 clear industry and its potential customers. Specific AEC authoriza- 

 tion was still required, however, before an American firm could do 

 anything which directly or indirectly constituted production of any 

 special nuclear material in countries of the Soviet bloc. 85 This re- 

 straint, in effect, precluded export of technical assistance, products, 

 or power plants to the Soviet Union. 



A RELUCTANCE TO EXPORT TECHNOLOGY 



The essence of Atoms for Peace was a commitment to share the 

 benefits of atomic energy, including atomic power, with friendly na- 

 tions. This purpose occasionally has come into conflict with the prin- 

 ciple that certain U.S. nuclear technologies should not be exported be- 

 cause of potential- threats to national security or to world peace. 

 Obviously there is no disagreement over control of weapons technology, 

 or that for peaceful nuclear explosives. But borderline cases do arise. 

 One example is to be found in the export of unclassified technology 

 and apparatus for the reprocessing of used nuclear fuels. Countries 

 interested in large scale use of nuclear power inevitably must reprocess 

 their own fuel or arrange for this service elsewhere. However, if they 

 build their own reprocessing facilities there arises the possibility of 

 unknown or illicit diversion of recovered nuclear materials to weap- 

 ons use, or into a black market for stolen nuclear materials. This issue 

 came to a head in L966 when foreign interests inquired of a U.S. com- 

 pany about fuel reprocessing technology. The company provided some 

 information. When the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy learned 

 of t he inquiry, it was critical of t he transact ion. ( Jommittee ( Ihairman 

 Chet Ilolilield wrote to the AEC to urge that no non-nuclear nation 

 should he assisted in obtaining information and technical know-how 

 on reprocessing technology unless that nation first agreed to place under 

 IAKA safeguards any fuel reprocessing facility that it might build. 8 ' 



Responding to i he cril icism, A E( ' < Ihairman Seaborg agreed on the 

 importance of bringing reprocessing facilities abroad under IAEA 

 safeguards. He informed the Joint Committee thai the AEC was un- 



i S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, .July- 

 Dec mbt r 1 95 5, "p. '-if .. p 93. 



'' V s. Congress, .Toinl Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements 

 for Cooperation — l'jcc, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 187. 



