173 



dertaking a study to determine how technical assistance by private 

 U.S. firms could be controlled to assure that safeguards would be ap- 

 plied to the facility involved. However, such information was unclas- 

 sified and AEC regulations for years had permitted its export to coun- 

 tries outside of the Soviet bloc. He suggested that the AEC might find 

 some specialized technical items needed for fuel reprocessing plants 

 which by regulation could be supplied by the U.S. nuclear industry 

 only if there was agreement that safeguards would be applied. 87 



The most recent manifestation of this conflict in purposes came in 

 July 1972 when the AEC published new regulations that forbade U.S. 

 companies to do business abroad in three fields of nuclear power-re- 

 lated technology unless AEC approved. 88 The new rules prohibited 

 "directly or indirectly" engaging in overseas production of heavy 

 water, chemical reprocessing of used fuels, or enrichment of uranium. 

 Xo reasons for choosing these three nuclear technologies were given 

 in the announcement. 



Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral Agree- 

 ments 

 U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power inevitably involved the 

 supplying of nuclear fuel materials to foreign countries. Since the 

 technical assistance program began well before the IAEA came into 

 being, there was the question of how the United States would assure 

 itself, and the world, that materials it supplied would be adequately 

 safeguarded against diversion. The question was answered by includ- 

 ing provisions for U.S.-conducted safeguards in the bilateral agree- 

 ments and also a provision calling for consultation with the United 

 States on transferring safeguards of U.S. materials to an international 

 agency when it was formed. U.S. policy for control over U.S. sup- 

 plied nuclear materials was established by the AEC in consultation 

 with the Department of State. The policy provided that : S9 



(1) The United States would give assistance and advice to the 

 recipient country in establishing a national system of control 

 over materials and equipment, including adequate materials ac- 

 countability and physical control measures ; 



(2) The system would be subject to audit, appraisal, and verifi- 

 cation by United States personnel ; 



(3) The specific measures applied in auditing and verifying the 

 system would depend upon the type and complexity of the facili- 

 ties involved and the type and quality of the material involved; 

 and 



(4) AEC staff would provide assistance and guidance to co- 

 operating countries. 



To indicate the range of U.S. safeguards activities for its bilateral 

 agreements, the AEC reported that in 1969 it had made 52 inspections 

 of facilities in five countries. These inspections included the first in- 

 spection of the unloading of fuel from a reactor, witnessing the first 

 seals to be applied to a power reactor, and inspection of a reactor fol- 

 lowing a radiation incident. 90 



"Ibirt., p. 187. 



* 8 Federal Register, vol. 37. July 26, 1972. pp. 14870-1. 



"■' T'.s. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Actiritics in the Atomic Energi) Programs, 

 J a nn a rp -December 1959 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OHice, I960), 

 p. 110. 



90 U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

 Commission for 1969 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 60. 



