174 



In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards pro- 

 visions of the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a 

 unique and extraordinary achievement in international relations. The 

 technological promise of nuclear power, reinforced bv incentives and 

 pressures of foreign policy, gave the United States the unusual right 

 to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdiction to inspect and 

 verify the use and holding of U.S. supplied nuclear materials. That 

 no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the 

 safeguard provisions of the bilateral agreements gives reason for some 

 optimism in the future of international relations. For, despite the 

 arguments and analyses of those who consider sovereign rights un- 

 alterable, there can be pragmatic yieldings and accommodations when 

 this is sufficiently in a nation's interest, 



The safeguards provisions of the U.S. bilateral agreements were 

 notable also in that they prepared the way for giving the Interna- 

 tional Atomic Energy Agency practical experience in administration 

 of safeguards. While details are given in later sections of this chapter, 

 it is worth noting here that this IAEA experience was certainly an 

 important factor in the subsequent negotiations of the Xonp ml itera- 

 tion Treaty with its provisions for international safeguards to be 

 applied by the IAEA. 



Conclusion and Current Issues 



One of the first assignments resulting from the effects of the dis- 

 covery of nuclear fission for American diplomacy was to negotiate and 

 administer a web of bilateral agreements for U.S. technical assistance 

 to foreign nations. Though of lesser status than treaties or executive 

 agreements, they nonetheless obtained for the United States unusual 

 rights not available through the more traditional and presumably 

 more potent and durable instruments of international relations. 



The bilateral agreements were created to provide special technical 

 assistance to foster civil use of nuclear energy abroad. These research 

 and power agreements demonstrated an effectiveness for supplying 

 information, materials, equipment, services, training, and advisers to 

 nations that were interested in nuclear power. The power agreements 

 also were notable in the rights they obtained for the United States for 

 control and safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials and certain equip- 

 ment. In the participating nations, inspectors of the United States had 

 access to the places where U.S. nuclear materials were being used to in- 

 spect them and to verify their quantities. In addition, because of fore- 

 thought of U.S. policy and the work of the diplomats and negotiators, 

 the. bilateral agreements had provisions which ultimately were to en- 

 able the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain useful experi- 

 ence with working safeguards. 



The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked 

 against one major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements 

 provided many advantages to the other countries, and because this web 

 of agreements obtained for the United States influence and leverage 

 that it otherwise might not have had, there has been a reluctance to 

 shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power in 

 Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to the 

 International Atomic. Energy Agency. From a' global viewpoint, it 

 might be seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear 

 power are in competition with the International Agency when they 



