178 



The Fruits of Negotiation 



After more than 3 years of intense U.S. diplomatic effort, an inter- 

 national statute was produced which the President approved on 

 July 27, 1957. This effort witnessed the unequal interplay between the 

 idealism and the pragmatic imperatives of international relations. The 

 outcome was an international agency that reflected only modestly the 

 ambitious and idealistic goals expressed by some groups of scientists 

 for Atoms for Peace. In December 1953 President Eisenhower had 

 proposed an international body with the following four major pur- 

 poses : 95 



First — encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime 

 uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had ail the mate- 

 rials needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate ; 



Second — begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's 

 atomic stockpiles ; 



Third — allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the 

 great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in 

 human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war ; 



Fourth — open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least 

 a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private 

 and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, 

 and is to make positive progress toward peace. 



In 1957 the negotiations produced an International Statute which 

 specified a limited goal for the IAEA. Article II specified that : 



The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 

 energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, 

 so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its 

 supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military 

 purpose. 



As "military purpose 7 ' is nowhere defined in the Statute, t ho mission 

 of the International Agency is general enough to accomplish as little 

 or as much as the member nations might desire. 



Arnold Kramish, an observer of the peaceful atom in foreign policy, 

 notes that the U.S. negotiators had decided early in the negotiations 

 to postpone the idea of a workable pool of nuclear materials. De- 

 emphasis of this arms-control function of the Agency also deempha- 

 sized the initial safeguards function. Instead, negotiators began to 

 talk of a "clearing-house" function, meaning that in some unspecified 

 way materials for future bilateral agreements would somehow be 

 channeled through the International Agency, but not be controlled by 

 it. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge gave an economic reason for this 

 change in role. Interviewed at the United Nations on Noveml>er 6, 

 1954. he said: "Since the resources of the Agency obviously will be 

 limited, it seems more useful to us to use the resources available to 

 the Agency for additional programs than for expensive custodial 

 arrangements." 96 At the same time, he said that the United States 

 would proceed independently with its bilateral agreements with other 

 countries, rather than channel them through the new Agency. 



Despite the limited goals finally established for the, International 

 Agency, the official U.S. assessment of the negotiations was optimistic. 

 Secretary Dulles assured the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

 that the I 'nited States had achieved its diplomatic objective of obtain- 



"Dwlpht D. EiRenhower, The Atom for Progress and Pence. Department of State Publi- 

 cation No. 5103 (Washington. DC. : T'.S Government Printing Office, 1954). 



99 The New York Times, November 6, 1054, p. 6. 



