183 



authorized by the Act, these materials must be distributed to the 

 Agency under agreements for cooperation. These provisions pre- 

 vented the AEC from furnishing nuclear materials wholesale to IAEA 

 which might then act as ia broker and finance its fuel supply function 

 by charging a brokerage fee while still keeping the price paid by 

 the recipient no more than would have been charged for direct purchase 

 from the United States. There was one exception. The AEC could 

 assist and encourage research on peaceful uses of nuclear energy or 

 medical therapy by distributing without charge during any year 

 material valued at not more than $10,000 in the case of one nation, 

 or $50,000 for any group of nations. Foreign distribution of nuclear 

 materials exceeding the 5,000 kilograms ottered by President Eisen- 

 hower would require congressional approval. 



The Act required the President to report annually to Congress on 

 the International Agency and U.S. participation ; the Department of 

 State and the AEC were directed to keep the Joint Committee on 

 Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations cur- 

 rently informed. 109 To prevent unacceptable changes in the Interna- 

 tional Statute, the Act required that in the event of an amendment 

 which the Senate disapproved by a formal vote, all authority for 

 U.S. participation would terminate. 



Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA 



When Congress authorized U.S. participation in the International 

 Agency, the AEC had had almost three years of experience with 

 negotiating and administering bilateral agreements to foster the civil 

 use of nuclear energy. Considering that the International Agency, in 

 its watered-down version, was to serve in part as a clearing house, 

 would the United States shift its emphasis from the bilateral agree- 

 ments and deal with other countries through the Agency ? This the 

 United States chose not to do. 



When Congress approved U.S. participation in the IAEA, the 

 United States already had bilateral agreements with some 40 coun- 

 tries. Most of these were for nuclear research with a few for nuclear 

 power. 110 Secretary Dulles and the State Department were inclined 

 toward channeling U.S. aid through the International Agency. Sec- 

 retary Dulles advanced three reasons for this: 



(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate pro- 

 visions for safeguards, unless there was an international agree- 

 ment on common standards, future competition among supplying 

 nations for the nuclear fuel market would almost certainly erode 

 the safeguards of the bilateral agreements; 



(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States 

 for development of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede 

 to U.S. inspection of the nuclear powerplants. "They will accept 

 international supervision indefinitely, but they will not, I think, 

 indefinitely accept mere inspection by another nation." 11X and. 



109 This annual reporting requirement was terminated In 1965 by Public Law S9-34S. 

 79 Stat. 1310. 



110 At that time, negotiation with 4S nations had produced 44 agreements for cooperation 

 with 42 nations. Of these, 34 were in force — 29 for research and 5 for power. The remaining 

 10 agreements were awaiting completion. Fifteen of the participating nations were Euro- 

 pean, with all of the Common Market nations represented. 



111 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 

 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 

 Agency, op. cit., p. 66. 



