189 



(3) The United States [should] take the lead in securing inter- 

 national agreement that the Agency be recognized as the instru- 

 ment most appropriate for carrying out certain important func- 

 tions in the field of atomic energy. 



(4) A detailed study [should] be made within the United States 

 Government of the steps to be taken to further the foreign policy 

 objectives in the field of atomic power. We believe that such a 

 study will show that an effective program need not be costly. 



(5) The United States Government [should] continue to sup- 

 port actively the programs of the Agency in the fields listed above 

 by providing financial assistance, by supplying experts for special 

 assignment, and by encouraging competent technical men to serve 

 upon the Agency staff. 



The Smyth Committee extended its study to include two primary 

 questions affecting atomic energy and foreign policy : 126 



( 1 ) Did atomic energy occupy a unique position in science and 

 technology at that time ? and, 



(2) Did the past and present achievements of the United States 

 in atomic energy give this country a unique opportunity and obli- 

 gation to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy ? 



The Committee's answer to each question was yes. 



As for the future of nuclear power and the IAEA, Professor Smyth 

 posed three questions of policy for the Joint Committee on Atomic 

 Energy : 



( 1 ) Did the United States wish to support the development of 

 nuclear power around the world ? 



(2) How important were safeguards ? 



(3) Was the United States really going to use IAEA, or would 

 it continue to work largely through bilateral or regional groups ? 



A STATE DEPARTMENT COMMENTARY 



In comment before the Joint Committee on the Smyth report, Mr. 

 Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Or- 

 ganization Affairs, foresaw that expansion of nuclear power was 

 likely to be important to foreign policy planning from two points of 

 view: safeguards, and assistance to developing countries. Of this 

 he said : 127 



First, we are concerned that adequate safeguards be maintained to guard 

 against military applications of a proliferating nuclear technology. Second, the 

 prospect of increasing use of nuclear energy for power as well as research makes 

 it important to help the newly developing nations to develop the new technical 

 people who can handle the new technology. 



But he discouraged the idea that the IAEA should be a channel 

 for financial aid for nuclear power or that the United States should 

 increase its proportional support of the Agency. 128 He anticipated 

 some undefined third-party role of the Agency in relation to U.S. 

 bilateral agreements. 



12a U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, United States Policy 

 Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. cit., pp. 2, 3. 



127 Ibid., p. 14. 



128 Elaborating on this point, he said : "We do not, however, believe that the IAEA or 

 any of the other technical agencies of the United Nations complex should be used as 

 channels for major inputs of financial aid. The IAEA is not a bank. We continue to believe 

 that the international, regional, and national financing institutions are better equipped 

 for this purpose," Ibid., p. 14. 



