191 



Thus IAEA safeguards could not be global in scope. Nevertheless, the 

 Agency's system provided a means to bring a few nuclear facilities 

 under safeguards and could set a desirable example of a workable in- 

 ternational safeguards system for the future. "For these reasons", 

 j>aid Commissioner Haworth, "the AEC judged the Agency's safe- 

 guards function to be the most important of its activities." 132 



As for the supply function, the AEC demurred. While any of the 

 bilateral partners of the United States could at any time utilize the 

 Agency, and it was AEC policy to encourage them to do so, Commis- 

 sioner Haworth gave assurance that many countries trusted and pre- 

 ferred the bilateral code : 133 



. . . Important as it may be to the Agency for it to serve as a supplier of ma- 

 terials (a question on which there have been different opinions) it is even more 

 important that Agency safeguards become generally applied. It is, therefore, of 

 great significance, in the interests of strengthening the safeguards function of 

 the Agency, that greater emphasis be given to the voluntary application of IAEA 

 safeguards to bilateral transactions. 



The idea that the IAEA should become involved in financing nuclear 

 power also was minimized by the AEC. There were other financial in- 

 stitutions. Moreover, a financial role for the IAEA could lead to an 

 unbalancing of its functions. It would not, in Ha worth's opinion, bene- 

 fit either the Agency or the United States for this country to use the 

 Agency as a broker to finance construction of a nuclear power plant at 

 an expenditure level several times as large as the Agency's entire 

 budget. 134 



A PESSIMISTIC POSTSCRIPT 



The year following the Smyth Committee report, one observer cau- 

 tioned that IAEA remained weak and lacking in direction. As seen 

 by Arnold Kramish, the Agency was not the idealistic mechanism en- 

 visioned by the President in 1953 to diminish the potential destruc- 

 tive power of the world's nuclear stockpiles, nor had it provided a new 

 channel for peaceful international discussion. If the Agency's 

 members wished to develop it for that purpose, they would have to 

 strengthen its support. 135 



Likewise in 1966, Sterling Cole was to comment that the IAEA was 

 still being avoided or circumvented, and that "not a single nuclear 

 power plant capable of producing by-product weapon material has 

 come under the Agency control . . ., except for psychological ges- 

 tures or demonstrations. 136 



The Decline of the Supply Function 



If the International Agency was to have a viable supply function, 

 the appropriate time to establish it was in 1959 when the AEC received 

 legislative authority to cooperate with the Agency. But this brokerage 

 function that was so important for the plans and hopes of Director 

 General Cole was discounted and minimized by the AEC. Appear- 

 ing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1959, Commis- 

 sioner Vance of the AEC ruled out the possibility that the United 

 States supplying nuclear materials to the International Agency on 



132 Ibid., p. 20. 



133 Ibid., p. 20. 



134 Ibid., p. 21. 



133 Kramish. op. cit.. p. 77. 



"'Sterling Cole. "Needed: A Rebirth of the IAEA," Nuclear News, vol. 9 (September 

 1966) , p. 19. 



96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 14 



