195 



that the Agency can send inspectors into the member states to check 

 nuclear materials that it supplies. 145 



CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN IAEA SAFEGUARDS 



The questions of what safeguards would entail, why they were 

 needed, and how they would work were of continuing interest to both 

 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint Committee 

 on Atomic Energy. Safeguards offered two sets of benefits : a means 

 to make disarmament more palatable, and a means to improve world 

 security in an area of nuclear energy. 



In sending the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

 to the Senate, President Eisenhower reassured Congress that the safe- 

 guards would be adequate and that the security of the United States 

 would not be endangered by nuclear materials made available to or 

 through the IAEA. Said the President: 146 



To achieve the confidence essential to cooperation among members of the 

 International Atomic Agency, great care has been exercised to insure that fis- 

 sionable material will be safeguarded to prevent its diversion to any military 

 purpose. A comprehensive safeguard system is provided by the statute. This 

 will apply to all aspects of the Agency's activity involving nuclear materials. 

 A key part of this system is a plan for thorough international inspection. The 

 United States will provide fissionable materials for Agency projects only as 

 the safeguard system is put into effect. I am satisfied that the security of the 

 United States will not be endangered by materials made available to or through 

 this Agency. 



In the hearings which followed, Chairman Strauss described the 

 International Agency as prospectively providing a practical, working 

 model of an inspection system for disarmament. He said : 147 



The Agency will not, of course, achieve atomic disarmament, nor was it con- 

 ceived to attempt that. However, it can promote United States objectives in 



115 Article XII specifies that the Agency shall have the following rights and responsi- 

 bilities for safeguarding its own proierts or those of member states : 



1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities including nuclear 

 reactors and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring that it will not further 

 any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety standards, 

 and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this 

 art'c'e ; 



2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the 

 Agency ; 



3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in 

 ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced 

 in the nroi'e^t or arrangement : 



4. To call for and receive progress reports : 



r>. To approve the means to he used for the chemical processing of irradiated mate- 

 rials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diver- 

 sion . . . and will comply with anplicable health and safety standards. . . . : 



6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated 

 by the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have 

 access at all times to all places and data and to any person ... as necessary to 

 account for source and fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to 

 determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in further- 

 ance of any military purpose . . . with the health and safety measures referred to in 

 . . . tbis article, and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between 

 tbe Agency and the State or States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency 

 shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if 

 that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or 

 otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions ; 



7. In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to 

 take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate 

 assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or 

 a member. . . . 



na •"The State of the International Atomic Energy Agencv." Message from the President 

 of tbe United States. S5th Cong.. 1st sess., March 21, 1957 (Senate Executive I), p. 2. 



147 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 

 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 

 Agency, op. cit, p. 87. 



