198 



safeguards on these exports can be realized only if an international organization 

 has developed a capability for applying safeguards and recipient nations are pre- 

 pared to accept them. 



EVOLUTION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS : A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY 



U.S. support of IAEA safeguards has been and is a curious mixture 

 of innovation, generosity, and unusual voluntary actions, offset by a 

 reluctance to commit the United States to reliance upon IAEA safe- 

 guards and an unreadiness to obtain for the International Agency the 

 financial and technical support it will need to carry out its expanded 

 safeguards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The 

 evolving nature of U.S. participation is illuminated in the following 

 chronology of developments in IAEA safeguards. 



Toward the end of 1957, the AEC was working on ways to help 

 the IAEA carry out its safeguards functions. In addition to assuring 

 that U.S. supplied nuclear materials would be used only for peaceful 

 purposes, administration of the safeguards was expected to accumu- 

 late technical and administrative experience that would be useful for 

 future IAEA operations. 154 



In 1959, Director General Cole attempted to expedite IAEA action 

 for a safeguards system. He pleaded with the Board of Governors 

 to do so. The nuclear nations represented should demonstrate for the 

 "have-not" nations that inspection and other safeguards were not an 

 unreasonable invasion of national sovereignty. But the Soviet repre- 

 sentatives were not cooperative. They challenged IAEA safeguards 

 as unacceptable intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign 

 states— a position U.S.S.R. representatives had taken during negotia- 

 tion of the International Statute— and argued that IAEA safeguards 

 would establish the domination of the strong over the weak states. 

 Apparently U.S. representatives and their supporters were able to 

 counter the Soviet position, for during 1959 the Board provisionally 

 approved principles for drafting a safeguards system. These principles 

 were never published. 



In May 1960, the Director General sent a draft of a proposed safe- 

 guards agreement to 70 governments. It provided for inspection by 

 IAEA inspectors of facilities using nuclear materials obtained 

 through the Agency, IAEA approval of reactor designs, and Agency 

 supervision of records of reactor operations. In September, this draft 

 was debated and adopted at the fourth General Conference. In 19G0 

 the AEC took a first step toward providing the IAEA with practical 

 working experience with safeguards. At the Agency's General Con- 

 ference^ it and several of its bilateral partners announced their will- 

 ingness to transfer to the Agency the administration of safeguards 

 for U.S. -supplied materials. In that year the United States volun- 

 teered to place four nuclear reactors under Agency safeguards. 155 

 Full IAEA safeguards, principles, and procedures would apply, 

 including inspection and verification of records and accounts. 156 



1M 



Decern 

 The. 



V S Atomic Encrev Commission. Proprcss in Peaceful Tines of Atomic Encroy.July- 

 mhe'r 1957 (Washington. DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office lOr.S), p. 196. 

 The four reactors Included two research reactors at the AECVFropkhaven National 



Laboratory, an experimental power reactor at the AEC's Argonne National Laboratory. 



and a small de ostration power plant In an electric utility at Plqua, Ohio. 



•"""T'S Atomic Enerpv Commission. Annual Heport to Congress of the Atomic Energy 



Commission for 1960 (Washington, DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1961). p. 205. 



