206 



to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com- 

 munity or the fostering of greater political unity among its member 

 states. While some European proponents of Euratom looked to it to 

 restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington 

 view was the opposite. The communique at the end of the "wise men's" 

 visit said that the parties agreed that Euratom should be solely the 

 stimulus to realize the objectives for nuclear power. 183 



In its assessment of U.S. policy for international development of 

 nuclear energy, the American Assembly reflected the optimism of the 

 times. It saw many benefits for the United States from encouraging the 

 use of this new power technology in Europe : 1S4 



A major effort on the part of American industry and government would provide 

 the American atomic power program with vitality and purpose and accelerate the 

 development of power at home. While it can be expected that highly industrialized 

 countries such as those in Europe will ultimately establish their own facilities for 

 building their atomic power plants, Euratom can provide American industry with 

 experience as well as a market for its products and technology. Such an effort 

 would assist the aims of American foreign policy in developing the economic 

 strength of, and American ties with, the Western European community, and . . . 

 would provide experience in the operation of large-scale reactors of great and 

 immediate benefit to our own development program. 



Soviet Opposition to Euratom 



International rivalries quickly raised diplomatic difficulties for 

 Euratom. The Soviet Union declared both Euratom and the Economic 

 Community to be instruments of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 

 nization and labeled Euratom a scheme to rearm Germany with atomic 

 weapons. The Soviet Union sent warning notes to each of the six 

 Common Market nations, urging them to accept instead the Soviet 

 plan for Pan-European economic and atomic integration. While this 

 warning was abortive, the Soviet Union was more successful in block- 

 ing later Euratom efforts to establish a close relationship with the In- 

 ternational Atomic Energy Agency. 



An example of the Soviet Union's position is a statement of the 

 U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry issued March 16, 1957. After agreeing that 

 economic cooperation in Europe would help to restore disrupted trade 

 and scientific and technical connections, the Soviet Union opposed both 

 the Euratom and the Common Market as in contradiction to those 

 aims and likely to increase the rift in Europe : 185 



However, the plans for creating Euratom and the Common Market are in 

 manifest contradiction with these aims. The first thins that strikes the eye 

 is that all those taking part in Euratom and the Common Market are members 

 of the military NATO grouping. It is obvious that the activities of Euratom and 

 the Common Market will be subjugated to NATO aims, the aggressive character 

 of whieh Is widely known. 



Under the circumstances, the creation of Euratom and the Common Market 

 would inevitably lead to a further widening of the rift in Europe, to an 

 aggravation of tensions in Europe, which would complicate the establishment 

 of economic and political cooperation on a European basis and give rise to fresh 

 difficuties in the solution of the problem of European security. 



Ma For further discussion of this point, Cf. Klaus E. Knorr. "American Forelcn Policy 

 and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Atoms for rower, United States Policy in 

 Atomic Bnergy Development (New York : The American Assembly, Columbia University, 

 1957), pp. 100 12fl nnd In particular pp. 123-127. 



1S * Atoms for Power, op. clt, p. 157. _ _ . _ 



"■U.S. < onfrress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enerpy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom. 

 Agreements, op. clt., p. 28. 



