207 



Three Policy Issues of Euratom 



Three issues in the final international negotiations for Euratom 

 further illustrate the problems that may arise out of a national decision 

 to foster application of a new technology for the benefit of American 

 diplomacy. While the U.S. role is not clearly visible in the working 

 out of these issues, it seems plausible that much encouragement and 

 influence flowed eastward across the Atlantic. 



The three major issues central to establishment of Euratom were : 



(1) Whether Euratom should manufacture enriched uranium; 



(2) Whether member states should be precluded from military 

 use of atomic energy ; and 



(3) Whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear 

 materials. These questions shared a common root ; to what extent 

 was Euratom to be an instrument to achieve economic inde- 

 pendence and political and military independence for Europe ? 1S6 



WHETHER EURATOM SHOULD MANUFACTURE ENRICHED URANIUM 



Until January 1957, European proponents of Euratom had pre- 

 sumed that the new organization would give top priority to building 

 facilities to enrich uranium. It seemed clear that such a facility would 

 be needed to reduce the dependence of Euratom states upon nuclear fuel 

 imported from the United States. But this expectation was dashed 

 early in 1957 when the Germans proposed that the plan be studied 

 further. Although the French pressed for immediate construction 

 the forces of delay prevailed. 



The issue impinged directly upon U. S. interests for at that time 

 the United States did not favor foreign production of enriched 

 uranium. The thought of an enriched uranium facility upon the Con- 

 tinent near Soviet-occupied territories and the possibilities that nuclear 

 materials might be illicitly diverted from such a plant moved the 

 United States to assure the Euratom nations of a supply of nuclear 

 fuel. Louis Armand let it be known that while he still favored the 

 ultimate construction of an enrichment plant in Europe, he rejected 

 it as an immediate objective for Euratom. 187 



The publication of A Target for Euratom defused the issue. Noting 

 that until recently the construction of a plant had seemed the only 

 way to obtain enriched uranium, the authors noted a changed condi- 

 tion : "But there is now no doubt that our countries can obtain en- 

 riched uranium from the United States in the necessary quantities, and 

 at low published prices." 188 They estimated that enriched uranium 

 produced in Europe would probably cost two to three times as much. 

 Furthermore, they anticipated the early reuse of plutonium produced 

 as a byproduct from other nuclear plants, the use of natural uranium as 

 a fuel, and the prompt development of the breeder reactor would 

 reduce European needs for enriched uranium. In the face of this 

 advice, the proposal to immediately build an enrichment plant dropped 



i8e Tij e discussion that follows draws heavily upon an analysis of Euratom published 

 in 1964 by Jeroslav G. Polach, a diplomat and later an economist with Resources for 

 the Future. Inc., who was interested in energy and Euratom. Cf. Jeroslav G. Polach, 

 Euratom, Its Background, Tssues, and Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry, New York : 

 Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), pp. 61-66. 



187 Cf. Le Monde. February 20. 1957 : also, Polach, op. cit, p. 62. 



188 A Target for Euratom, op. cit., p. 56. 



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