91 



Despite the kind of attention to detail which might have been expected 

 to ease Soviet fears, the Soviets continued to express adamant opposi- 

 tion to some of the fundamental features of the plan. This attitude 

 may have lessened the value of the efforts by the UNAEC to formulate 

 the finer points of the control system. 



The third report of the UNAEC may have been commenting on the 

 need for the acceptance of the general concept of international owner- 

 ship, when it stated : 



Only if traditional economic and political practices are 

 adapted to the overriding requirements of international se- 

 curity, can these proposals be implemented. Traditional con- 

 cepts of f he economic exploitation of the resources of nature 

 for priv • e or national advantage would then be replaced in 

 this fielu by a new pattern of co-operation in international 

 relations. 85 



With regard to inspection, the first report of the UNAEC had stated 

 that "only'' through an "international system of control and inspec- 

 tion" can atomic energy be "freed from nationalistic rivalries." 86 It 

 called for "a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspec- 

 tion." On the "freedom of access" issue, the UNAEC seemed to put its 

 recommendations in even more specific terms than Baruch, when the 

 report stated that the treaty or convention establishing the interna- 

 tioral Authority should contain provisions — 



* * * Affording the duly accredited representatives of the 

 utornational control agency unimpeded rights of ingress, 

 3gi ss, and access for the performance of their inspections 

 and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every 

 participating nation, unhindered by national or local 

 authorities. 87 



Committee Two's report, appended to the first UNAEC report, had 

 referred to the need for inspection quite frequently in regard to a num- 

 ber of activities. The group defined inspection as follows : 



2. Inspection means close and careful independent scrutiny 

 of operations to detect possible evasions or violations of pre- 

 scribed methods of operation. In addition to direct auditing 

 measures as described above, inspection may include observa- 

 tion of points of ingress to and egress from an establishment 

 or installation to ensure that materials and supplies are flow- 

 ing in the prescribed manner, observation of the activities 

 within the establishment or installation, and measures in the 

 form of aerial or ground survey and otherwise to guard 

 against clandestine activities. To be fully effective, the power 

 of inspection may require that the operations be carried on in 

 a specified manner in order to facilitate the inspection. In this 

 event, inspection verges on supervision. 88 



The need for inspection was discussed in Committee Two's report, 

 and during the negotiations, insofar as it related to examination of 

 "declared" activities, i.e., those facilities operated by the proposed 



83 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Official Records. Third year. Special 

 Supplement. "Third Report to the Security Council. May 17. 194S." (Lake Success, New 

 York : August 1948) p. 4. (AEC/31/Rev. 1. June 27, 1948.) 



86 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Com- 

 mission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p 16. 



87 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 



88 Ibid., p. 44. 



