70 



pressed sufficiently to make it reasonably clear that the United States 

 would be limited, if not completely crippled, in its ability to meet its 

 secret agreements with the British for postwar collaboration on atomic 

 energy matters. 23 



His appointment was apparently motivated by a belief that he could 

 help enlarge the Administration's freedom of action in the field of 

 international negotiation. Baruch represented the kind of public 

 servant who could be entrusted with America's security, as well as 

 one who was respected in international circles. Indeed, the chairman 

 of the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee pledged Baruch's con- 

 firmation without a hearing, once he had assured the committee in 

 writing that "there would be no treaty and no disclosures without safe- 

 guards, and that no agreement of any kind would be entered without 

 the consent of Congress." 24 



The appointment and acceptance of Baruch appear to have been 

 based primarily on respect for his political acumen. At any rate, the 

 motivations behind the choice of the chief negotiator were not of the 

 same character which prompted the appointment and work of Ache- 

 son's committee and the Board of Consultants. Indeed, by some per- 

 sons, Baruch was not thought to be qualified for the job. The members 

 of the Board and Acheson's committee declined to continue in these 

 groups under Baruch, partly on the grounds that if Baruch pursued 

 policies with which they disagreed, they wanted to retain the right to 

 voice their opposition. 25 



One member of Baruch's group — namely, Hancock — reacted nega- 

 tively to Baruch's suggestion that the Board of Consultants continue 

 its work under the auspices of the State Department. Hancock stated : 



These problems are not often purely scientific problems. 

 They blend very quickly into political problems * * *. The 

 scientists tend to be unbending and calculating in the field 

 of science — which is natural — but they carry over their in- 

 elasticity into arguments in the field of international affairs, 

 politics in the proper sense, and negotiation. 26 



Apparently there was little common outlook between those represent- 

 ing mainly a scientific approach, who had developed the recommen- 

 dations for a policy of international control of atomic energy, and 

 those representing chiefly a political approach, who were responsible 

 for conducting the diplomatic negol iations to implement the emerging 

 policy. 



2n In August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had signed an executive agreement, known 

 as thi' Quebec Agreement, which was nol made public, and affirmed Anglo-American coop 

 eration on atomic energy during the war. A year later, the two leaders signed an aide- 

 memoire to supplement the earlier agreement, which provided for full collaboration between 

 the two countries following the war. Attempts were made to renegotiate the agreement 

 al the time of the Truman-Attlee-Klng conference, when the Americans asserted that active 

 collaboration could not be carried out through an executive agreement. Nonetheless they 

 agreed, at least in principle, to the idea of equal partnership, in the form of "full and 

 effective cooperation." Eventually In April 1!)4<;. when the British pressed for further 

 fulfillments, Truman Informed them thai he Interpreted this phrase to Include only the 



field Of hasic scientific Information, and thereby finalized the U.S. decision to withdraw 

 from any arrangement which WOUld have Involved lending practical assistance to endeavors 



such as building ami operating production plants. The primary rationale behind thi^ policy 

 was that the agreement could aol be kept secret under the provisions of the U.N. ("barter 

 and public control efforts which were about to begin, Afte. the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 

 was passed, compliance with the agreements, as the British Interpreted them, would have 

 been legally forbidden. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic 

 Energy Commission, pp, i'7s 280, 177 I7:i 



-' Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 264 



"■Hewlett and Anderson. History of tin United States Atomic Energy Commission, 

 p. 560. 



" Llebennan. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 291. 



