194 



body could also contribute to international control of nuclear mate- 

 rials. Safety procedures for such hazardous materials and other safety 

 concerns are intimately related to the measures for an effective inter- 

 national safeguards system. 144 



Despite these statements attesting to the importance of a nuclear 

 safety function for the IAEA, there remains a confusing proliferation 

 and apparent overlap of radiation safety guides and standards. In 

 Europe, there are standards issued by the IAEA and standards pro- 

 mulgated by Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific 

 Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, rather than transfer 

 the functions of that U.N. committee to IAEA. Meanwhile, the role 

 of the International Agency in setting standards for construction and 

 operation of nuclear power plants is now dormant. If commercial nu- 

 clear power expands in Europe, as optimists are beginning to antic- 

 pate, the issue of international standards for safety and to control 

 environmental effects can be expected to revive. If and when it does, 

 U.S. diplomats are likely to be faced with the question to what extent 

 and in what way should such standards apply to domestic nuclear 

 power plants? Should the United States voluntarily agree to apply 

 such standards to the domestic industry? Should the United States 

 voluntarily permit inspection of design, construction, and operation 

 of commercial nuclear power plants? What would be the effect on 

 the Intel-national Agency were the United States to refuse to acknowl- 

 edge the applicability of these standards? Then too, what might 

 such a conflict do to the competitive position of the U.S. nuclear 

 industry in the world market ? 



In ternational Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 



Of all the negotiating issues faced by the diplomats and their 

 scientific advisors in drafting the IAEA statute, the most intrac- 

 table was the safeguarding of nuclear material?. U.S. negotiators were 

 caught between (a) the demand for credible inspection and control 

 of nuclear materials to reduce the chances of proliferation of nuclear 

 weapons, and (b) the reluctance of the non-nuclear nations to sur- 

 render any sovereign rights to permit inspection. In these negotiations, 

 the Soviet Union chose to emphasize the issue of sovereign rights and 

 to oppose international inspection. The final compromise reached at the 

 United Nations Conference Avas to restrict safeguards to IAEA proj- 

 ects or to those projects voluntarily placed under IAEA safeguards. 

 Thus hopes were dashed for a worldwide safeguards system that 

 would apply to all nuclear materials and facilities in peaceful 

 applications. 



On paper, the Statute specifies an impressive array of power and 

 responsibility for the Agency in enforcing safeguards for its projects, 

 or projects assigned to it by member states. The International Statute 

 requires that such arrangements include provisions for IAEA 

 examination of design of nuclear equipment, including power 

 reactors: that IAEA health and safety measures be observed: that 

 records be maintained for nuclear materials produced or used; and 



*** Kramish, op. clt., pp. r>n-CO. 



