93 



vals," but opposed permanent stationing of inspectors in countries. 

 Soviet proposals on this subject, though more detailed than others, 

 were considered by the majority of the Commission as failing to pro- 

 vide 



an adequate basis for the development * * * of specific 



proposals for an effective system of international control of 



atomic energy. 92 



The U.S. interpretation of the Soviet proposals on inspection was that 

 it was "concerned chiefly with bookkeeping and reports." 93 As far as 

 investigation of clandestine activities was concerned, the Commission 

 reported that in the "minority" (Soviet) position, "inspection as to 

 clandestine or unreported facilities is virtually ignored." 94 As was the 

 case with international ownership, the extent of agreement on details 

 achieved by a considerable number of UNAEC members was nullified 

 by Soviet opposition to the basic principles behind the proposals on 

 inspection. 



In commenting on the impasse in the negotiations, the third report 

 of the UNA EC seemed to focus on how the inspection issue, and the 

 agreed technological requirements of control, challenged national at- 

 titudes toward security, secrecy, and sovereignty. It said : 



* * * Secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compat- 

 ible with lasting international security. Cooperative develop- 

 ment and complete dissemination of information alone prom- 

 ise to remove fears and suspicion that nations are conducting 

 secret activities * * *. 



The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the im- 

 pact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sov- 

 ereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees 

 no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their 

 sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals. 

 It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent 

 national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfill the 

 Commission's terms of reference. 95 



Moreover, the third report placed the issue in a larger perspective 

 when it expressed, if perhaps too f acilely, the hope that : 



The new pattern of international co-operation and the new 

 standards of openness in the dealings of one country with an- 

 other that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy 

 might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation 

 in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass de- 

 struction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an 

 instrument of national policy. 96 



The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 



A second major problem for U.S. policy and for the negotiations in- 

 volved the manner in which an international control Authority would 

 assume its responsibilities, or the stages by which there would be a 



82 Proposals and Recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 

 Sec. 2, "Report and Recommendations of the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic 

 Energy Commission, adopted May 17, 194S." pp. 77-78, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- 

 war Negotiations, p. 66. 



93 State Department, Polici) at the Crossroads, p. 137. 



91 U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047, p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Postwar 

 Xeriotiations, p. 66. 



95 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, "Third Report to the Security Council," 

 pp. 4-5. 



98 Ibid., p. 5. 



