540 



nied any assistance in development of capabilities which might be a 

 threat to U.S. security. Although somewhat inconsistent in applica- 

 tion, a policy of reward-penalty appeared to be followed by the United 

 States, apparently with three main objectives : 



(1) to encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lower- 

 ing force levels, and moderating crisis management ; 



(2) to encourage detente through moderation and reform of the So- 

 viet regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic 

 reform, freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate; 



(3) to encourage polycentrism in the Communist world, detente in 

 the foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than 

 the U.S.S.R., and moderation in their domestic policies. The impor- 

 tance of these several objectives has varied over time, but each appears 

 relevant today. 



Although the United States and the Soviet Union still have political 

 differences in various world crises, there is some evidence of a moderat- 

 ing of international tension. The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limita- 

 tion Talks (SALT) provide a mechanism for moderation in the devel- 

 opment of both strategic offensive and defensive weapons ; the Treaty 

 on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim 

 Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of 

 Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, are evi- 

 dence of apparent progress. 15 The multilateral European Security 

 Conference (ESC) and discussions of mutual and balanced force re- 

 ductions (MBFR) may reflect a similar development in the area of 

 military force reductions. 16 



At the same time, questions remain on the significance and enduring 

 character of the change in relations. In the three areas of detente — 

 hostilities and security, internal moderation and reform, and easing 

 of the control system in Eastern Europe — opinions vary on the changes 

 to date and future prospects. Indeed, quite divergent views on these 

 various aspects of the new relationship are expressed by different 

 observers : 



(a) On hostilities and security. — Some observers argue that the 

 Soviet Union acts as a moderating influence on North Vietnamese and 

 Middle Eastern leaders and uses its leverage to dampen tensions and 

 hostilities. Others maintain that the Soviet Union fosters proxy wars 

 to its own benefit, and that the continuations of the Arab-Israeli and 

 Indoehinese conflicts are not incompatible with Soviet aims. 



Moreover, some argue that Soviet leaders have a pressing need to 

 reorder priorities and that the SALT agreements permit them to pro- 

 ceed on badly needed civilian programs for modernization of the tech- 

 nologically backward Soviet economy. Others contend that the Soviet 

 Union, with a well-developed military research and development base, 

 will seek to turn its numerical advantage in strategic offensive weapons 

 into a position of overall superiority by closing the technological lead 



"The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two deslg 

 nated areas in the United States and the Soviet Union, and at a low level. The Interim 

 Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. 



14 Preliminary talks on the European Security Conference began in Helsinki on Novem- 

 ber 22, 1972. The purpose of the Conference, which will include most of the countries of 

 East and West Europe, the United Stntes. and Canada, Is to attempt to solve problems of 

 European security and cooperation. Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions 

 began on January 31. 1973 in Vienna. The purpose of the talks Is to negotiate a reduction 

 of military forces in Europe. 



