334 



ones, 119 and remarks of Soviet Academician Sedov indicated that 

 Soviet military rockets might be used for the launchings: 



It seems to me that the time has come when it is possible to direct all forces and 

 means toward mutual efforts for creating an artificial satellite and to switch the 

 military potential in the technology of rockets to the peaceful and noble purposes 

 of developing cosmic flights. I think that such work would be an important con- 

 tribution to the cause of eliminating the cold war and would serve the cause of 

 consolidating peace. 120 



Again, Soviet announcements did not arouse much interest and 

 went largely unnoticed. 121 Thus, as a result of widespread publicity 

 given the U.S. effort as contrasted with the relative lack of attention 

 paid the Soviet effort, the launching of Sputnik I was almost univer- 

 sally greeted with great astonishment and surprise. As expressed by 

 Sullivan, 



In the consternation that ensued in the West, either it was forgotten that the 

 satellite launchings were part of an international scientific effort or there was a 

 strong feeling that the Russians had not played the IGY game according to the 

 rules. 122 



This strong reaction to the news of Sputnik I was summarized by 

 Walt W. Rostow, as follows : 



There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by the 

 launching of the Soviet earth satellite on October 4, 1957. This intrinsically 

 harmless act of science and engineering was also, of course, both a demonstration 

 of foreseeable Soviet capability to launch an ICBM and a powerful act of 

 psychological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political 

 life which radically reversed the Nation's ruling conception of its military problem, 

 of the appropriate level of the budget, and of the role of science in its affairs. 

 The reaction reached even deeper, opening a fundamental reconsideration not 

 only of the organization of the Department of Defense but also of the values and 

 content of the American educational system and of the balance of values and 

 objectives in contemporary American society as a whole. 123 



These reactions are discussed in greater detail below. 



FEDERAL SUPPORT OF BASIC SCIENCE 



The net effect of the IGY and Sputnik I on Federal support for 

 basic science in the United States was unprecedented. Many effects 

 were evident, including the restoration of Federal funds for scientific 

 facilities that previously had been closed, strengthening of the Federal 

 Government's in-house research efforts, and increased benefits for 

 Federal scientists and engineers. Perhaps the most striking effect, 

 however, was the change in appropriations for the National Science 

 Foundation (NSF). Established by Congress in 1950, the NSF 

 had "struggled through its first few years with appropriations far below 

 even its fixed ceiling of $15 million." 124 By 1956, the NSF budget had 

 increased to almost $30 million, about half of which, however, was 

 specifically budgeted for IGY activities, as shown in table 5. Three 

 years later, as pointed out by Berkner, 



'• Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 160. 

 » » S »: K richer. Behind the Sputnik*, pp. 330-331. 

 >" Sen itc, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 160. 

 »' Sullivan "The IGY, p. 300. 



>" Wait W. Rostow, The I nil t<l States in the World Arena; An Essay in Recent History (New York:Harper 

 an I Row, 1'60), p. 366. 

 i" NSF-NAS Hearings: IQY Report, p. 191. 



