434 



Johns Hopkins offer was substantial in the professional communities in all the 

 riparian states by opening up new horizons; that it was a morale boost to non- 

 communist states by promise of a better future in spite of present difficulties ; 

 and that it was an incentive to North Vietnam to consider the alternative to war 

 by assuring them their foe could be generous. 



The effectiveness and limitations of large-scale proposals for technological de- 

 velopment as a means of diverting attention and energies from military 

 conflict 



As I indicated above, there is little reason to believe that a carrot approach 

 alone will force totalitarian leaders to change their policies. And I am con- 

 vinced President Johnson shared this view even when he made his offer to in- 

 clude North Vietnam in postwar development plans. Yet there is evidence, as 

 first reported by C. L. Sulzberger from Hanoi, that at least some North Viet- 

 namese leaders were interested in President Johnson's offer. And while I have 

 no knowledge whatsoever of the background of President Nixon's more recent 

 offer of a $7.5 billion reconstruction program with $2.5 billion earmarked for 

 Hanoi, I am satisfied it was made in the belief it would help Hanoi to alter its 

 course. When, and if, these offers or other circumstances persuade North Viet- 

 nam to turn to peaceful pursuits, then I remain persuaded that it will be enor- 

 mously helpful to package reconstruction efforts around the Mekong River 

 development scheme. I believe this will strengthen support in the United States to 

 provide the funds and if negotiated carefully in the field can be a strong in- 

 centive for regional cooperation among the riparian states. 



Steps that might have been taken in the United States to make the President's 

 proposal more attractive to the leadership in North Vietnam 

 I did, of course, think often in 1965 and 1966 about what else could be done in 

 the United States to make the Johns Hopkins offer more acceptable to the leader- 

 ship in North Vietnam. We did most of them — principally launch, together with 

 United Nations agencies, a whole series of studies and plans for the Mekong 

 program calculated to show the sincerity of our postwar intentions. I believe 

 that via UN and other channels leaders in North Vietnam were kept well abreast 

 of the good prospects of their participating in these plans. My own extensive 

 contacts in the United States persuaded me that the American public would 

 support development and reconstruction-type aid to North Vietnam once the war 

 was over. Therefore) I did not see the problem as primarily one of further action 

 in the United States to confirm the President's offer. Our postwar record in 

 Germany and Japan is no doubt fully appreciated in Hanoi. 



A broader view of the possible role of technology in contributing toward a tcorld 

 of peaceable, and economically healthy States, and what the United States 

 program might be toward this contribution 

 There are many others more competent than I to speak to the role of technology 

 In international development. What I can do is underscore from my experience 

 with the World Bank, and subsequently, that all developing countries, and espe- 

 cially the newly trained elite rapidly assuming power, are intrigued with the 

 prospects of leapfrogging along the hard road to development by making use of 

 all the new technology available. This is possible as some of our businessmen 

 know who must compete with the very latest machinery and equipment some- 

 times found in the least developed countries. Also significant, and frequently 

 overlooked, is the fact that new technology is regularly introduced, particularly 

 by governments, in advance of the administrative reforms and training programs 

 needed to make the new technology more efficient and economical than the old. 



