197 



There are no common norms or standards binding on all ; there are no common 

 agreements accepted by all. The result is international lawlessness or anarchy 

 which shows itself chiefly in the ungoverned — and for the moment seemingly 

 ungovernable — race for nuclear armaments. 



This international situation is not simply the road to anarchy. It is itself anar- 

 chy. Unless and until this anarchy is resolved into some decent measure of order, 

 neither America nor the world at large could enjoy even that basic security that 

 consisted in the assurance of continued national existence. 



BILATERAL VS. IAEA SAFEGUARDS 



Since U.S. bilateral agreements provide for U.S. safeguards, it 

 might be asked what difference does it make whether U.S. nuclear 

 materials are safeguarded under the bilateral agreements or through 

 the International Agency. This question was probed by the Joint 

 Committee in 1964. Dr. Henry Smyth, speaking both as the U.S. repre- 

 sentative to the IAEA and as an adviser to the State Department and 

 the AEC, outlined three major advantages of international safe- 

 guards : credibility, uniformity, and expense. He said : 152 



First of all, we believe that international safeguards may be viewed as more 

 credible than bilateral safeguards. That is, if the U.S. Government, or any 

 other government, for that matter, is conducting safeguards inspections in the 

 nuclear installations of a very close ally, some question might arise in the minds 

 of people at large as to the thoroughness and efficacy of such inspections. If, 

 on the other hand, those same inspections are conducted by an international 

 inspectorate in which a variety of countries is represented, no one in the world 

 can doubt their thoroughness and objectivity. 



Second, we believe that it is important that the safeguards applied to various 

 countries be uniform. If 10, 11, or more countries set up their own individual 

 inspection systems, it may well turn out that one country has a vigorous 

 system and that another country has a lenient one. If transferred materials and 

 equipment, whatever their source, are subjected to the same inspection under an 

 international organization, there will be complete uniformity - of safeguards 

 standards. 



Third, we believe it is far more expensive for many different countries to 

 establish inspection systems than if one international secretariat representing 

 the governments both of the supplying countries and the receiving countries 

 undertakes this whole job. 



The AEC itself outlined five reasons favoring replacement of bi- 

 lateral safeguards, with those of the IAEA. It testified that : 153 



1. The most effective safeguards, the United States believes, are those carried 

 out by an international organization. While bilateral safeguards provide adequate 

 assurances to the supplier against diversion of materials supplied by them, 

 only internationally applied safeguards are capable of giving equivalent as- 

 surances to the world at large that nuclear material supplied by one country 

 to another is not being diverted to military uses. 



2. Application of safeguards by an international organization develops the 

 experience and competence in an international staff which can serve as an im- 

 portant precedent for international inspection in connection with any future 

 disarmament agreement. 



3. International safeguards would be uniformly applicable and, therefore, 

 would minimize tendencies toward discriminatory treatment which might reduce 

 arrangements to the level which the least strict bilateral arrangements required. 



4. Relying upon the IAEA to carry out the safeguards function enhances the 

 prestige and increases the responsibilities of the IAEA and thereby makes it a 

 more effective instrument in all of its fields of endeavor. 



5. Many supplying countries will probably find it difficult if not impossible to 

 undertake bilateral safeguards on nuclear materials which they supply. Effective 



102 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree- 

 ments tor Cooperation, S8th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1965, p. 141. 

 153 Ibid., p. 140. 



