214 



multinational technological cooperation in Europe. They were unwill- 

 ing to subordinate national development in a community-wide effort. 

 Rene Foche, an international civil servant, describes this principle as 

 false because it implies that every European state has an equal right 

 to develop every form of advanced technology within its own borders, 

 which is the antithesis of the concept of regional specialization charac- 

 teristic of a true common market. 198 



The experience of Euratom illustrates a diplomatic reality. The po- 

 litical cohesion of members in an international technological under- 

 taking is a prerequisite for success, not a desirable byproduct from it. 

 The troubles of Euratom's research and development programs show 

 also that the cohesive force of internationalism in science was not 

 strong enough to withstand the divisive forces of national commercial 

 interests. 



A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an organ- 

 ization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that seek to create 

 and apply new technologies. The Treaty of Rome recognized this 

 principle by providing for five-year research programs. The first 

 five-year plan (1958-1962), concentrated upon organizing Euratom's 

 research, particularly at its Joint Research Center. The second five-year 

 plan (1963-1967) was soon wracked by dissension and budget troubles. 

 The third five-year plan (1968-1972) was not authorized and Eura- 

 tom's research is now funded annually. 



THE FIRST 5-YEAR PLAN (1958-1962) 



Research programs for the first 5-year plan were specified in 

 detail in an annex to the treaty. It was devoted mainly to equipping 

 the establishments of the Joint Research Center and to organizing 

 contract, research. For the first 5-year plan $215 million was al- 

 located. This amount proved to be more than enough because of a 

 slow start and there was a surplus in 1962 to carry forward. "While the 

 $215 million spent for the first 5-year plan was a considerable 

 sum, it corresponded approximately to the amount spent on nuclear 

 research in one year by the United Kingdom. 



Even the first 5-year plan suffered from dissent arising out of 

 divergent national approaches to nuclear power technology. The 

 French argued that Euratom research should focus upon reactors 

 using natural uranium as a fuel, thus reducing European dependence 

 upon imported enriched fuels, while the Italians preferred research 

 on uses of enriched fuels. 



THE SECOND 5-YEAR PLAN (1903-1967) 



The second 5-year plan started off ambitiously, with the Euratom 

 Council unanimously approving a budget of almost $450 million. In 

 1965 an additional $5.6 million was allocated. But the plan soon was 

 in difliculty. As interests of the member states continued to diverge, 

 they jockeyed for the advantage of having Euratom develop the 

 particular nuclear power technology they favored. Inflation also 

 became a strain and increased the costs of research, particularly at 



1 Foche, op. cit., p. 24. 



