92 



Authority or by national or private management licensed bv the Au- 

 thority. Suspected clandestine activities seemed to present" the most 

 difficulties in the findings and recommendations of the UNAEC and 

 in the negotiations themselves. Committee Two's report seemed to rec- 

 ognize that inspection for clandestine activities represented one of 

 the more troublesome political problems to be dealt with in the ne- 

 gotiations. Moreover, it reflected a recognition of how certain inherent 

 technological demands of atomic energy control were in conflict with 

 traditional political requirements of states: 



Like all problems in atomic energy, the detection of clan- 

 destine operations is greatly simplified by the technical facts 

 of the field. Nevertheless, general and political considerations 

 play a larger part in the effectiveness and acceptability of any 

 system for the detection of clandestine operations than in most 

 other parts of the problem. They will need most careful con- 

 sideration when the functions, powers, and organization of 

 the agency are defined. It will be here that the conflicts be- 

 tween the requirements of the international control agency on 

 the one hand and considerations of national sovereignty and 

 present practice on the other will have to be resolved. 89 



The second report of the UNAEC attempted to deal with the politi- 

 cal problems associated with inspection in a section entitled "Rights 

 of and Limitations on the International Agency in Relation to In- 

 spections, Surveys, and Explorations." It offered 21 specific proposals 

 on such subjects as procedural details of inspections, ground or aerial 

 surveys, and the like. Six of these were devoted to proposals dealing 

 with investigation of clandestine activities. 90 Many of these procedural 

 proposals were made with the understanding that they should be in- 

 corporated in the treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The 

 following concluding statement may serve as a general comment on 

 the character of the inspection envisioned by the UNAEC in its sec- 

 ond report: 



In summary, the proposals contained in this chapter pro- 

 vide very extensive powers of inspection and search which 

 enable the agency to visit any accessible place and provide 

 appropriate procedures applicable in certain specified circum- 

 stances. It has to be recognized that, in addition to these pro- 

 posed procedural requirements and limitations, the good sense. 

 as well as the budget, of the agency will themselves be limita- 

 tions on the exercise of powers given to the agency and that, 

 by virtue of the prospective functions of the agency which 

 have been proposed in previous chapters, the amount or inspec- 

 tion required and t he attendant interferences will be much less 

 than would be necessary under a control system which sought 

 to depend on inspection alone. 1 ' 1 



With regard to declared facilities, the Soviets woidd agree only to 

 "periodic inspections." or to inspections "carried out at definite inter- 



» Ibid., p. 56. 



■ The main categories of these proposals were the following: (1) requirement of war 

 rants or special consenl ; cj i granting of special consent : (3) resorl to domestic or inter 

 national court, body, or official; (i> domestic •■,,urts. bodies, or officials required to issue 

 warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause; (5) International court, body, or 

 official required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause: and (6) 

 scope of warrants. Complete details of these proposals <;m be found in United Nations 

 Atomic Energy Commission, "The International Control of Atomic Energy, The Second 

 Report to the Security Council", pp. 54—55. 



« Ibid., p. 50. 



