107 



Thus, by proposing sanctions to achieve "an international law with 

 teeth in it," Baruch may have compensated for losing the personal op- 

 portunity to propose and negotiate a comprehensive disarmament plan. 

 He may also have sought to satisfy the requirements of a control system 

 which he believed the emerging political relationships of the atomic age 

 demanded. 



POLITICAL UNACCEPTABILITY OF VETO-FREE CONTROL IN THE 



NEGOTIATIONS 



At issue during the negotiations, sanctions and the veto became in- 

 volved with the political arguments associated with the general issue 

 of the veto power in the United Nations. In order to understand how 

 this issue contributed to the failure of the negotiations, it might be 

 helpful to examine briefly the course of the issue and U.S. policy during 

 the international discussions of international control of atomic energy. 



During the negotiations, the third U.S. memorandum provided a 

 vehicle to answer the various legal questions arising from the rela- 

 tionship between the proposed international Authority and the United 

 Nations, and an important part of this issue was sanctions. The memo- 

 randum listed those activities which if pursued by an individual na- 

 tion would constitute a serious threat to the peace. These included 

 virtually every possible breach of the control arrangement. 138 



The memorandum proposed that the Security Council would deter- 

 mine the response to these violations. In defending the provision to 

 exclude these matters from the veto, the U.S. position was that it did 

 not impair the principle of unanimity in the United Nations, because 

 nations would enter into this particular arrangement freely. It also 

 emphasized that the proposal to exclude the veto applied only to the 

 question of atomic energy. An additional point raised by the memo- 

 randum was that the question of sanctions could not be discussed 

 without considering the provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 

 which recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self- 

 defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 

 Nations." Besides noting that an attack with atomic weapons would 

 justify a response under Article 51, the memorandum suggested that 

 a broader definition of "armed attack" might be included in the treaty 

 for the Authority, to include certain preliminary steps to such action. 



Baruch was unyielding on the veto question during the negotiations, 

 and his perseverance was matched by the adamant opposition of the 

 Soviet Union. One example of the Soviet position on this question is 

 in a speech by Gromyko in July 1946 : 



We believe that it would be wrong, and perhaps fatal, to 

 undermine, in practice to abandon, the principle of unanimity 



i3s in e gal possession or use of an atomic bomb ; illegal possession, or separation, of 

 atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb ; seizure of any plant or other property 

 belonging to, or licensed by, the Authority ; willful interference with the activities of the 

 Authority ; creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the 

 absence of, a license granted by the Authority. The U.S. proposal also granted that admin- 

 istrative decisions would be made and carried out only by the international Authority, and 

 that the Authority could make decisions on other matters, which were not serious threats 

 to the peace. The" latter could be enforced by the Security Council as procedural matters, 

 a process which did not involve the veto. State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 

 161-163. 



