72 



veto power in the Security Council would not apply on questions con- 

 cerning the fulfillment of sanctions. 28 



In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation submitted 

 three memoranda which elaborated on the U.S. position. 29 These 

 documents and the speeches of Baruch set forth the details of the U.S. 

 position on the various issues covered in the discussion below. 



THE SOVIET PROPOSAL 



The Soviet proposal was presented at the second meeting of the 

 UNAEC on June 19, 1946, by Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign 

 Minister and the Soviet Representative on the U.N. Security Council. 

 Demanding that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful 

 purposes, he proposed that a first step should be a convention outlaw- 

 ing the production and use of atomic weapons. Following such an 

 agreement, he continued, there should be established "a system of su- 

 pervision and control to see that the conventions and agreements are 

 observed, and measures concerning sanctions against unlawful use of 

 atomic energy." 30 



At this time, Gromyko introduced two resolutions to implement the 

 Soviet principles of international control. The first called for an agree- 

 ment to ban the use and production of atomic bombs and to destroy 

 existing weapons within three months of the conclusion of the agree- 

 ment. This resolution also provided that the parties to the proposed 

 agreement would pass legislation to punish violators of the agreement. 

 The second resolution proposed that two committees be established : one 

 to make recommendations on the exchange of scientific information, 

 and another to examine methods of insuring compliance with the 

 prohibitions of the agreement, including sanctions. The only direct 

 response by Gromyko to the U.S. proposal was the expression of 

 Soviet opposition to elimination of the veto: 



Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security 

 Council, including efforts directed to undermine the require- 

 ments of unanimity of the members of the Security Council, 

 upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the in- 

 terests of the United Nations * * * . Such attempts should be 

 resisted. 31 



The veto question was to remain at issue throughout the negotiations. 

 One source has described the Soviet proposals as inchoate: 



Gromyko's proposals of June 19 have, frequently been de- 

 scribed in the Western press and by the Soviet representatives 

 t hemselves as the "Soviet plan": but they really constituted no 

 plan at all. Not, if by a plan, one comprehends a systematic 



28 For a complete text of Banich's speech, see "Proposals for an International Atomic 

 Development Authority." Department of State Bulletin, v. 14, no. 364 (June 23, 1946), 

 pp. 1057-1062, or State Department, Growth of a Policj/, pp. 138-147. 



»The three memoranda were entitled U.S. Memorandum No. 1. Submitted to Sub- 

 committee No. 1 <>t the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New V>rk. July -'. 

 1946; D.S. Memorandum No. 'J Dealing with the Functions and Powers of the Proposed 

 Atomic Development Authority. Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations 

 Atomic- Energy Commission, New York, July r>, 1046; and D.S. Memorandum No. 3, Deal 

 Ing With the Relations Between the Atomic Development Authority and the Organs of the 

 United Nations, Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic Energy 

 Commission, New York, July 12, 1946. _, 



30 Joseph I,. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International control of Atomic Energy. 

 t N.>tre l lame. Ind. : I'niversit v of Notre Dame Press, l!'t;i |, p. 36. 



m Ibid., p. 37. 



