69 



Writing in 1948, J. Robert Oppenheimer summarized the general 

 trend of thinking within the scientific community toward the atomic 

 challenge which confronted U.S. diplomacy : 



The control of atomic weapons always appeared possible 

 only on the basis of an intensive and working collaboration 

 between peoples of many nationalities, on the creation * * * 

 of supra-national patterns of communication, of work, and of 

 development. The development of atomic energy lay in an area 

 peculiarly suited to such internationalization, and in fact re- 

 quiring it for the most effective exploitation, almost on tech- 

 nical grounds alone. The development of atomic energy lay in 

 a field international by tradition and untouched by pre-exist- 

 ing national patterns of control. Thus, the problem as it ap- 

 peared in the summer of 1945 was to use our understanding of 

 atomic energy, and the developments that we had carried out, 

 with their implied hope and implied threat, to see whether in 

 this area international barriers might not be broken down, 

 and patterns of candor and cooperation established which 

 would make the peace of the world. 21 



The U.S. negotiator and final steps to define policy : In the mean- 

 time, on March 18, 1946, to bring the issue to the United Nations, the 

 President named Bernard M. Baruch U.S. representative to the 

 UNAEC. One source offers the following description : 



Bernard Mannes Baruch * * * had by his 75th year become 

 a symbol of America to his fellow Americans as well as to 

 people all over the world. An immensely successful financier 

 who had built a fortune in the lusty days of business boom, 

 a public servant and sought-after counselor to Presidents of 

 both political parties, Baruch was one of the most trusted men 

 in all of America. The fact that he was Jewish seemed to 

 assure his place in the public mind because it gave his life that 

 quality of equal opportunity realized, of Horatio Alger, that 

 is so important to America's self-image. 22 



Included in the delegation to the UNAEC were Baruelvs choices 

 from leading members of the banking business : Herbert Swope, John 

 M. Hancock, and Ferdinand Eberstadt ; the fifth member of the dele- 

 gation was Fred Searls, a mining engineer, formerly a journalist, and 

 head of the New York State Racing Commission. Richard C. Tolman, 

 who had served as a scientific advisor to General Groves, was chosen 

 for the same role in Baruelvs delegation. 



Aside from the fact that Baruch spoke for U.S. policy on inter- 

 national control of atomic energy, his appointment might be consid- 

 ered in two respects with regard to the central issues of this study : the 

 primary motives behind the appointment and his role in the policy- 

 making process. As to the reasoning behind the appointment of Ba- 

 ruch, at this time the issues surrounding the domestic control of atomic 

 energy were far from resolved, and prominent among them was the 

 possibility of excessive restrictions on the release of information. Con- 

 gressional hesitation to allow a free flow of information had been ex- 



a J. Robert Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Bulletin of the 

 Atomic Scientists, v. 4. no. 2 (February 1948), pp. 41-42. 

 83 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the tarantula, p. 261. 



