73 



and comprehensive procedure for action. Gromyko's "plan" 

 was, in fact, the enunciation of three or four basic principles 

 which guided Soviet policy ( promotion of peaceful develop- 

 ment of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons, agree- 

 ment on international control, and the retention of full sov- 

 ereign freedom of action) plus proposals for the further 

 organization of the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with 

 the problems of control and the exchange of scientific informa- 

 tion. On the exact form of international control, Soviet state- 

 ments were deliberately vague. 



32 



DEBATE AND IMPASSE 



Early in the negotiations, the structure of the UNAEC was orga- 

 nized to include four committees : a Scientific and Technical Commit- 

 tee, a Legal Advisory Committee, Committee Two to examine all the 

 questions associated with a control plan, and Committee One to coordi- 

 nate the work of the other three committees. In July 1946, at the second 

 session of Committee Two, Soviet representative Gromyko delivered 

 a major speech condemning the U.S. proposals, and declaring that 



as they are presented now [the proposals] could not be ac- 

 cepted by the U.S.S.R., either as a whole or in their separate 

 parts. 33 



When further efforts to negotiate seemed fruitless, it was decided to 

 postpone the deliberations of Committee Two until a report from the 

 Scientific and Technical Committee had been submitted. 



The report of the latter Committee, similar in purpose to that of the 

 Acheson-Lilienthal groups, was given to Committee Two on October 2, 

 1946. Committee Two had passed a resolution suggesting that the Sci- 

 entific and Technical Committee "present a report on the question 

 whether effective control is possible, together with an indication of 

 the methods by which * * * effective control can be achieved." 34 The 

 Scientific and Technical Committee had decided to confine its con- 

 siderations to the requirements of a control system as dictated solely 

 by the technical characteristics of atomic energy development, and 

 disclaimed any responsibility for taking political feasibility into ac- 

 count. Obviously, the major portion of the information on atomic 

 energy was supplied by the United States, primarily through the 

 Smyth report and the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In light of this fact, 

 the Soviet representative to the Committee interpreted the conclusions 

 of the Committee as "hypothetical and conditional" because the Soviets 

 considered the information "limited and incomplete." 35 Despite this 

 statement, the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee 

 concluded that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific 

 facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically 

 feasible." 3G 



33 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 



33 State Department. Growth of a Policy, r>. SI. 



34 As quoted in First Renort on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of Control. In United 

 Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to 

 the Security Council, 31 December 1946," Official Records. Special Supplement. Report to 

 the Security Council. (Lake Success, New York : 1946), p. 20. 



35 Ibid., n. 50. 



36 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 86. 



