74 



In addition, the Committee reemphasized the scientific principle which 

 had provided a basic element in the efforts to establish international 

 control of atomic energy, when it stated : 



There is an intimate relation between the activities required 

 for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of 

 atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the 

 former are also needed for the latter. 3 ' 



The report defined the various dangerous points in atomic energy 

 development at which some form of safeguard should be applied, but 

 made no recommendations for specific methods of safeguards. 



Committee Two continued its deliberations and prepared a report 

 which set forth specific safeguards for various activities, but these 

 were deemed only the basic elements of a plan and not a complete plan 

 for control. 



The report on safeguards and that of the Scientific and Technical 

 Committee were included in a report prepared by the full membership 

 of the T T .X. Atomic Energy Commission, and submitted to the Security 

 Council on December 31, 1946. The report had been approved by 10 

 members of the Commission, with the remaining two, the Soviet Union 

 and Poland, abstaining. Following this expression of majority ap- 

 proval, Baruch and his. staff resigned on the grounds that the U.S. 

 representative to the United Nations (at this time, Warren Austin) 

 should serve as the U.S. spokesman in the Security Council. This first 

 report of the UNAEC offered various findings and recommendations 

 based largely on the proposals submitted by the United States. By 

 March 1!> 17. when its debate on the provisions of the first report failed 

 of agreement, the Security Council passed a resolution which referred 

 the discussions back to the UNAEC and requested a second report 

 from that body. The major sources of disagreement in the negotiations 

 are discussed below. There was to be little narrowing of these differ- 

 ences in the subsequent negotiations of the UNAEC. 



One source describes the "deadlock" at this time as "particularly 

 ominous not because of specific Soviet objections to the majority plan, 

 but because Soviet criticism was made a part of its ideological con- 

 flict with the West." !s Some of the U.S. policymakers who had engi- 

 neered the U.S. plan, including both scientists and politicians, became 

 disillusioned with the negotiations, and even suggested that the United 

 States withdraw from them. However, consultations with U.S. allies 

 had discouraged such an idea, and the negotiations continued "'because 

 world opinion would not let them stop." 39 



In September 11)47, the UNAEC submitted the second report to the 

 Security ( louncil, elaborating on the specific recommendations for con- 

 trol in the first report. Besides engaging in this exercise, the second 

 round of the. UNAEC deliberations had considered a list of 12 amend- 

 ments which the Soviet Union proposed be applied to the findings and 

 recommendations of the first report. These amendments, which sought 

 to alter some of the fundamental features of the majority plan, were 

 not accepted by the Commission. Examples of the questionsot principle 



; [bid., p. 36. 



Is NoRee, Soviet Policy, p. 88. 



80 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 391. 



