79 



cussions was the secrecy shrouding Soviet activities. One source de- 

 scribes this phenomenon as follows : 



Western ignorance about the real condition of Russia was 

 deemed by the regime, quite logically from its point of view, 

 as one of the greatest assets it had in its conduct of foreign 

 relations. Access to the U.S.S.R. was never so difficult — i.e., 

 virtually impossible — for a foreigner who was not a diplomat 

 or Communist, travel throughout the country never so limited 

 as between 1946 and 1954. Not even during the Great Purge 

 of the 1930's were restrictions so all-encompassing. The fear 

 which this restrictive behavior suggests cannot have been 

 simply a concern over revelations about the police-state 

 aspects of Soviet life. By 1947, only Communists, fellow 

 travelers, and the most naive of Western liberals denied that 

 aspect of Soviet reality. Much more dangerous was any revela- 

 tion of Russian weakness, of the magnitude of the tasks of 

 industrial reconstruction and rapid demobilization lying 

 ahead of this still primitive society. A truer picture of Rus- 

 sia's strength and weaknesses might induce some new and 



unwelcome thinking in the State Department and the 

 Pentagon. 46 



Just as U.S. secrecy surrounding the bomb presented problems for its 

 policy and the negotiations, the secretive nature of the Soviet Union 

 would have a serious effect on the efforts to reach agreement on some 

 of the fundamental elements of control. 



Soviet development of atomic energy had proceeded quite well until 

 World War II. 47 In terms of the quality of research, the Soviet capa- 

 bility at that point has been estimated to have been on a par with that 

 of the United States, and the Soviets were catching up in the field of 

 equipment. As the extent of Soviet involvement in World War II in- 

 creased, however, they apparently found it necessary to abandon their 

 efforts. All available manpower and resources were directed to meet 

 the German attacks, rather than toward the "calculated gamble" of 

 research for a nuclear weapon, at least until the setback for the Ger- 

 mans at Stalingrad in 1943. Moreover, as one writer has asserted, "the 

 Soviet military strategy of enormous masses of ground troops, backed 

 by artillery and close air support was not conducive to a whole-hearted 

 search for weapons useful to strategic aircraft." 4S 



Nuclear research in the Soviet Union was resumed in 1944, but a 

 blackout was imposed on information at that time. It has been theorized 

 that the first Soviet nuclear reactor was in operation by late 1947. This 

 occurrence was considered a turning point in the Soviet efforts, a point 

 which was reached less than two years after the opening of the nego- 

 tiations for international control of atomic energy. It was only a 

 matter of time before the Soviet research efforts succeeded, as evi- 

 denced by the explosion of its first nuclear device in 1949. 



The contribution of Soviet espionage activities in the United States 

 to progress in the field of atomic energy is hard to assess. One writer 



^Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals. America and Russia Since World War II. (New York: 

 Viking Press. 1971). pp. 106-107. 



47 The following discussion is based on Kenneth Whiting. "Post-War Strategy," in Asher 

 Lee, ed. The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 91-95. 



«Ibid., p. 92. 



96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-7 



