97 



if someone suddenly doublecrossed them." 103 It was finally agreed 

 that the Board would add a section to its report to deal with stages, 

 but only in a "speculative way."' The purpose of the new section was 

 "to give the report the ring of reasonableness." 104 



During the discussions with the committee, Lilienthal had ques- 

 tioned the group's competence to set down the transitional stages. In 

 a meeting following the presentation of their first report to the com- 

 mittee, the Board members were apprehensive about the idea, appar- 

 ently because of its political implications. One source has described the 

 meeting as.follows : 



All had serious misgivings about adding a section on stages. 

 It was not that they had any illusions about Russia. They 

 recognized that the shift to international control must come 

 in orderly steps. But they considered it bad tactics to write 

 in an implied distrust of other nations. Their report assumed 

 the good faith of Russia. It permitted the concept of stages to 

 evolve during the negotiations. It avoided giving the plan a 

 made-in- America stamp that would prejudice others against 

 it. Yet what could the consultants do ? If they refused to write 

 the fourth section, someone else would. Perhaps they ought to 

 stick with the task and see it done well. Distinctly unhappy, 

 fearing they were blighting the spirit of the work, they de- 

 cided to undertake the revision. 105 



Final version — some technological considerations : In keeping with 

 the concern expressed by Acheson's committee, the main thrust of the 

 discussion in the Acheson-Lilienthal report on transition to interna- 

 tional control was the effect which the transition process would have 

 on U.S. facilities and information, and thus on the status of U.S. 

 military security. The report stated that two different kinds of sched- 

 ules needed to be considered. One would include "indispensable re- 

 quirements for the adoption and the success of the plan itself" and 

 these steps were "fixed by the plan itself." 106 The second kind of sched- 

 ules consisted of a number of options which were considered "compat- 

 ible with the operability of the plan and affecting primarily its accept- 

 ability to the several nations." 107 The task of choosing from these op- 

 tions involved the acceptance of the parties concerned. Therefore, it 

 should be left to the international negotiations. In dealing with these 

 two kinds of schedules, the report divided the nature of the releases 

 by the United States into two categories: material and information.. 



The discussion of the release of fissionable materials cited the two 

 kinds of schedules mentioned above. In discussing those material ac- 

 quisitions by the Authority which were viewed as "fixed by the plan it- 

 self," the report treated only the initial operations of the Authority. 

 The first step, regarded as "an essential prerequisite for all further 

 progress," was for the Authority to obtain "cognizance and control 

 over the raw materials situation." Various other steps were listed re- 

 garding initial operations of the Authority, but none would affect 

 U.S. weapons production facilities. The report left the determination 



103 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 257. 



lf ' 4 Hewlett and Anderson. History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 

 p. 549. 



m Ibid., p. 547. 



106 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 45. 



10T Ibid. 



