98 



of the schedules for the transfer of these facilities for later negotiation. 

 The same treatment was given to disclosures of information. Nego- 

 tiators would need some kinds of information to gain an adequate 

 understanding of atomic energy, and thus contribute to effective nego- 

 tiation of control. In making a case for these disclosures, the report 

 cited an earlier study of classified information, prepared by a group 

 in the Manhattan project, which delineated various groups of infor- 

 mation which could be released or which had to be retained. The 

 Acheson-Lilienthal report noted that this earlier report had been able 

 to identify certain categories of information which could be released in 

 the absence of international control without jeopardizing national se- 

 curity. In appealing for the release of certain kinds of information, 

 the Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that all of this information 

 fell into releasable categories. 108 



The Acheson-Lilienthal report suggested that the timing and se- 

 quence of the release of more sensitive information would depend on 

 the negotiated stages whereby the international Authority would as- 

 sume its operations. Some of this information would be required to 

 enable the international Authority to undertake its initial operations. 

 Another portion, particularly that on atomic weapons, would not have 

 to be released until such time as the Authority was allowed to pursue 

 research in this field, presumably during some later stage of transition. 

 The report did emphasize that when the Authority was prepared to 

 take over an operation, the United States and other countries would 

 be obliged to release to the Authority all information, practical and 

 theoretical, pertinent to that activity. The report also added that in 

 order to take over some activities, the Authority would have to carry 

 on planning in advance, and that for these purposes, information 

 might have to be released prior to actual operations by the Authority. 

 In discussing the need to negotiate many of the schedules for the as- 

 sumption of control by the international Authority, the consultants 

 commented on the demands this practical requirement for informa- 

 tion release placed on U.S. policy : 



The extent to which special precautions need to be taken to 

 preserve present American advantages must be importantly 

 influenced by the character of the negotiation and by the 

 earnestness which is manifested by the several nations in an 

 attempt to solve the common problems of international con- 

 trol. These questions lie in the domain of highest national 

 policy in international relations. 109 

 The release of both fissionable material and atomic information was 

 discussed in the report in relation to U.S. security; in both areas, the 

 report declared that the position of the United States would continue 



»°*The Acheson-Lilienthal report described the product of the Declassification Committee 

 as follows: "It recommended against declassification at the present time oi a very con- 

 sidernble body Of technical, technological, industrial, and ordnance information, that is 

 information bearing directly on the manufacture of weapons and the design and operation 



of production plants. Bit* it recommended the. prompt declassification of a large Dortyot 



.' ..^ S_ -. ' j -n J.--T.-I i i—e „t:„„ «* ,,..,, ,.,-H I. >iil nntllro find W (IP n III) lea 111 1 IV. 



furtherlngTffoSn lo^I-tera muT.rnaT^cirrit^in the absence of International measures. 

 Ibid., pp. 53 54. 



we Ibid., p. 49. 



