100 



the concept beyond the level of detail contained in the Acheson- 

 Lilienthal report. Indeed, very little was said regarding: the relation- 

 ship between the need for stages and U.S. security. In his remarks 

 to the opening session of the UNAEC, Baruch mentioned stages only 

 in regard to what would seem to be a procedural matter. He merely 

 asserted that full control of atomic energy would ''have to come into 

 effect in successive stages," and that the transition should be set 

 forth in the charter creating the Authority. Baruch recalled the 

 language of the resolution creating the UNAEC as the basis for this 

 provision. 



Baruch did mention the U.S. role during the transitional stages, 

 with regard to the release of both information and facilities, in terms 

 which obviously offered few. if any, immediate concessions on the 

 part of the United States. As far as information was concerned. 

 Baruch outlined basically the procedure recommended in the Aeheson- 

 Lilienthal report, stating that only the information necessary to an 

 understanding of atomic energy in the negotiations would be revealed 

 by the United States until a successful conclusion was reached. Further 

 disclosures would depend "in the interests of all. upon the effective 

 ratification of the treaty," and would be carried out when the inter- 

 national Authority Avas prepared to assume certain functions. In his 

 comments on U.S. facilities, he said that, "The United States was 

 prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control 

 of activities in this field to the Authority." 112 



The first U.S. memorandum expanded somewhat on Baruch's state- 

 ment that the charter establishing the international Authority would 

 specify the sequence and timing of the transition from the existing 

 conditions to international control. Besides citing this requirement, 

 the memo stated that the charter also should specify "the time when 

 and the conditions under which the national and private possession, 

 manufacture, and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed." 113 

 Nevertheless, U.S. policy on the specific question of the timing for the 

 disposal of existing weapons, a major question dining the negoti- 

 ations, was not mentioned. The second U.S. memorandum treated the 

 question of transit ional stages in a similar manner and did not provide 

 any additional elaboration of the U.S. position, particularly concern- 

 ing its own contributions during the transitional process. 



Soviet policy on the question of stages was concerned primarily 

 with the timing of the destruction of existing atomic weapons. It called 

 for the establishment of international control following an agreement 

 on the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons. This sequence 

 was never accepted by the majority during the negotiations: 



While it is generally agreed that atomic weapons must be 

 eliminated from national armaments, the majority have con- 

 cluded that such elimination should come at that stage in the 

 development of the international control system which would 

 clearly signify to the world that the safeguards then in op- 

 eration provided security for all participating states. 114 



Indeed, the Soviet Union itself recognized that there could be no guar- 

 antee that a second agreement establishing a control system would be 



u* State Department, drouth of a Policy, p. 146. 

 '"Thirl p 14!) 



u* U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047. p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- 

 war Negotiations, \>. I 



