101 



concluded following conclusion of an agreement to prohibit and de- 

 stroy atomic weapons. 115 Apparently, Soviet skepticism regarding the 

 sincerity of U.S. pledges to destroy its bombs after the institution of 

 international control contributed to the persistence of the Soviets in 

 standing by their own proposals. Probably they saw advantage also in 

 delay. It seems a strong probability, moreover, that the progress of 

 their own development of atomic energy may have reinforced the de- 

 termination of the Soviets to maintain their position. (The Soviet 

 negotiators may not have been aware of that progress, but those from 

 whom they received their policy directives presumably were fully 

 informed.) 



In regard to negotiation of the transitional stages, the issue was 

 probably reduced to the question of when the United States would 

 relinquish its monopoly over atomic energy, or more specificially, its 

 bombs and the facilities for producing them. The Soviets asked what 

 assurance there was that destruction actually would be carried out. 

 During the negotiations, U.S. policy on this particular question was 

 not defined beyond the pledge that destruction of existing stockpiles 

 would take place when effective safeguards had been established. Ef- 

 forts by the UNAEC to settle this question in more precise terms were 

 unable to reach an* agreement satisfactory to the Soviets. 



The question of U.S. cessation of bomb production in relation to in- 

 ternational control had been raised during the deliberations which 

 resulted in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Despite Acheson's assertion 

 in the letter of transmittal that the report had not taken a position 

 on the timing for a halt of U.S. weapons manufacture, the treatment 

 of the issue in the report has been interpreted as follows : 



* * * the report took no definite position, implying there- 

 fore, that atomic weapons would continue to be built. Bomb- 

 making would have to stop sometime, but that was a ques- 

 tion for the President to determine consistent with consti- 

 tutional processes and in the light of the world situation. 116 



In a speech before Freedom House in October 1946, Baruch pledged 

 the intention of the United States to destroy its bombs "if the world 

 would join in a pact to insure the world's security from atomic war- 

 fare." His comments on destroying U.S. weapons prior to establish- 

 ment of the system posed the question : 



Why should America alone be asked to make sacrifices by 

 way of unilateral disarmament in the cause of good will? If 

 equality of sacrifice be needed then each should participate. 117 



Truman himself had written to Baruch the previous July : 



We should not under any circumstances throw away our 

 gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against 

 us. 1 



In discussing the negotiations, Bechhoefer describes this question as 

 "perhaps the most fundamental divergence between the Soviet posi- 

 tion and that of the West." To Soviet questions on when bombs would 

 be eliminated, the U.S. response was that the majority had concluded 



115 Ibid. . p. 71. 



ua Laeberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 258. 

 117 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 90. 



118 Hnrrv S. Truman. Memoirs, vol. 2. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, N.Y. : 

 Doubleday, 1956), p. 11. 



