102 



that weapons should be eliminated "at that stage in the development of 

 the international control system which would clearly signify to the 

 world that the safeguards then in operation provided security for all 

 participating States." 119 



Bechhoefer cites one discussion during the second year of the negoti- 

 ations which illustrates the "indecisive nature" of the negotiations on 

 the question of stages. The Soviet Union had proposed an amendment 

 to the first report which simply called for destruction of manufactured 

 and unfinished weapons. The first UNAEC report had proposed dis- 

 posal of bombs, an expression which meant the elimination of the bomb 

 mechanism and the peaceful use of the nuclear fuel from the dis- 

 mantled weapons. The Soviet amendment had omitted any provision 

 for use of the nuclear fuel, which posed the real danger following de- 

 struction of the bomb mechanism, although they agreed that the fuel 

 should not be destroyed. During discussion of the amendment, the 

 U.S. representative raised the point that the real issue was not destruc- 

 tion of the weapons but control of the nuclear fuel from dismantled 

 weapons. In response, the Soviet representative insisted that the 

 issue of control could not be discussed apart from destruction of weap- 

 ons. Attempts to settle this question in the form of a resolution were 

 fruitless, when the group could not even agree on a definition of the 

 term "'destruction." References to the term could not be separated from 

 the issue of stages, which comprised the basic source of disagreement 

 between the positions expressed by the United States and the Soviet 

 Union. 120 



In the face of this impasse, a section on the majority plan for control 

 in the third report of the UNAEC included the following statement 

 regarding stages, which had been retained verbatim from the recom- 

 mendations in the first report : 



The treaty should embrace the entire programme for put- 

 ting the international system of control into effect and should 

 provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional proc- 

 ess over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and 

 agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establish- 

 ment of international control of atomic energy. In order that 

 the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible, 

 and with safety and equity to all, the United Nations Atomic 

 Energy Commission should supervise the transitional proc- 

 ess, as prescribed in the treaty, and should be empowered to 

 determine when a particular stage or stages have been com- 

 pleted and subsequent ones are to commence. 1 '-' 1 



The final report recognized that more details would be desirable, but 

 stated that it would serve no useful purpose to attempt to elaborate on 

 this and other questions "until agreement on the basic principles of 

 control has been reached." 122 



Thus, it would appear that efforts to determine the sequence and 

 t imingof the assumption of control by the international Authority may 

 have originated in the negotiations simply as a question of tin 1 pro- 



1W I* S Participation in the U.N., report 1947, p. 10.1 as quoted in Beehhoofer, Postwar 

 \ egotiations, p. 74, 

 <-*' For ;i il.'iailod discussion of this particular point, see ibid., i>i». 72-74. 



121 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission^ "Third Report to the Security Council", 

 p. 17 is 



122 Ibid., p. 3. 



