103 



cedural steps necessary for setting up the control system. However, the 

 negotiations soon became preoccupied with the political implications 

 of stages, which were important to the security interests of both 

 the United States and the Soviet Union ; that is, the question of when 

 the United States would no longer be the sole power in possession of 

 atomic weapons. 



The Issue of Enforcement : Sanctions and the Veto 



The third important issue in the effort to establish international 

 control of atomic energy was that of imposition of sanctions on viola- 

 tors. The question of whether violators of international control should 

 be punished grew out of Baruch's advocacy of the idea. He succeeded 

 in having it adopted as part of the U.S. proposal. During the negotia- 

 tions, the question of the procedural arrangements to deal with sanc- 

 tions — specifically, whether the veto power in the U.N. Security Coun- 

 cil could be exercised over decisions on them — represented a major 

 obstacle to agreement. 



DETERMINING U.S. POLICY ON SANCTIONS 



Conant had cautioned the Board of Consultants at the outset that 

 the issue of sanctions was a matter for the Security Council to con- 

 sider ; and during later discussions, one member of the Board pointed 

 out that it would have been presumptuous for a group of technical 

 consultants to comment or make recommendations on such a political 

 subject. During its deliberations, the Board foresaw war as the prob- 

 able outcome in case of a violation, but needless to say it did not enter 

 into the subject of the organizational mechanism that would be em- 

 ployed to initiate, conduct, and coordinate the war. This was a political 

 problem, in the opinion of the Board, and there was no discussion of it 

 in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. 



Baruch's idea of establishing sanctions to enforce the control system 

 was discussed at the time the U.S. proposal was being developed. At a 

 meeting between Baruch's group and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups, 

 opposition by the latter to the idea of sanctions was unanimous, ap- 

 parently on the grounds that they did not consider the concept work- 

 able under existing political circumstances. In turn, the members of 

 Baruch's delegation to the UNAEC viewed the Acheson-Lilienthal 

 plan as offering merely a warning device and less than a secure system 

 to guarantee control of the destructive uses of atomic energy. Although 

 Lilienthal granted that the plan was only a warning device, he, 

 Acheson, and other members of their groups argued that absolute 

 security was unattainable, 123 Nonetheless, Baruch felt strongly that the 

 plan did not provide an adequate measure of security and continued to 

 press Secretary Byrnes for a policy which included penalties. Baruch's 

 position on penalties has been described as follows : 



It was important to * * * show the necessity of enforcing 

 the engagements of the nations. Baruch considered penalties 

 the sine qua non. He was quite aware this might bring the 



123 Later, Baruch called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the plan for atomic 

 energy control. Both General Dwisrht Eisenhower and Admiral Chester Nimitz voiced doubts 

 on the effectiveness and acceptability of sanctions, while General Carl Spaatz supported the 

 idea. Although Baruch sought the advice of the military, their views did not enter into the 

 discussions which determined policy. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States 

 Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 575— 576. 



