108 



of the permanent members of the Security Council * * * We 

 cannot accept any proposal which would undermine in any 

 degree the principle of unanimity of the permanent members 

 of the Security Council on all questions relating to the main- 

 tenance of peace and security. 139 



Bechhoefer notes that Baruch attempted "to soften the impact of 

 his position" by recalling that the proposal to eliminate the veto would 

 apply only to the control of atomic energy. He also points out that in 

 terms of the legality of the provision, it would not affect the veto 

 power as established by the U.N. Charter. But, in Bechhoefer's view, 

 because the proposal "ran counter to the basic concept of the continued 

 unity of the great powers as embodied in the Charter," it indicated to 

 the Soviet Union "a U.S. decision to attack the underlying basis of 

 postwar settlements." 14 ° 



Baruch was so firmly convinced of the correctness of his stance 

 on the veto that he may have missed an opportunity to bargain with 

 the Soviets on the issue, or at least to place them in a position where 

 they would be called upon to reveal further details of their proposals. 

 Bechhoefer cites an instance in 1947, when the Soviet Union proposed 

 an amendment that the Authority "should carry out their control and 

 inspection functions, acting on the basis of their own rules, which 

 should provide for the adoption of decisions, in appropriate cases, 

 by the majority vote". 141 The Soviet Union was willing to grant the 

 majority vote of the Authority "in appropriate cases," a term which 

 could have been explored. Nonetheless, discussion of this amendment 

 would have "shifted the question from the problem of a veto to the 

 issue of the authority of the control commission, which was politically 

 far less sensitive." However, Baruch would accept nothing less than 

 his original proposal. 142 



While U.S. policy on the veto had its foundations in both techno- 

 logical and political factors, it would appear that the underlying po- 

 litical relations of the great powers in the United Nations provided a 

 major source of the difficulty in the negotiations. Indeed. Bechhoefer 

 concludes that Baruch's position on the veto gave the Soviets the op- 

 portunity to oppose the U.S. proposals "'for the wrong reason." The 

 basis for this assertion is that disagreement over the veto involved basic 

 political differences between the two countries rather than the substan- 

 tive, technical aspects of control. 143 



Recap'/tiihiflon of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 



Thus, the United States brought before the United Nations three 

 issues making up a program of international control of atomic energy. 

 The first involved the control institution itself. This called for a 

 scheme of international ownership and regulation, with considerable 

 intimate interaction with national programs of atomic energy develop- 

 ment. Possibly the newly-formed United Nations would have been un- 

 equal to the large task of managing such a program. But the tech- 



"■ [bid. p. B2. 



'hhoefer, Postwai Negotiations, pp. .~>7 58. 



1,1 State Department, Policy >ii the Crossroads, p. ~f>. 



"■' Emphasis added. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 59. 



'" [bid., pp. 59 '''<> 



