142 



of the United States. The Act stipulated that until Congress should 

 declare by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international 

 safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes 

 had been established, there could be no exchange of information with 

 other nations for the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. 

 Xo such joint resolution has ever been introduced. 



As the cold war intensified, the United States began to favor the 

 sharing of some nuclear information to strengthen its NATO allies. 

 To this end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended in 1951 14 

 to authorize the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under cer- 

 tain conditions to enter into arrangements with allies of the United 

 States to give them certain nuclear information. 15 



In congressional debate on this amendment many Members indi- 

 cated their belief that such nuclear cooperation should be entered into 

 only for reasons so compelling as to overbalance the preference for 

 secrecy of the original legislation. Clearly, the 1951 amendment was 

 intended to strengthen military alliances rather than to foster commer- 

 cial use of nuclear energy in Europe. 



The restrictions of the 194G atomic energy legislation upon U.S. 

 technical cooperation with other nations are notable for attitudes they 

 represent. During the war years, close collaboration of scientists and 

 engineers of the allies had produced the atom bomb within the short 

 span of six years from the initial observation of fission in uranium. 

 Once atomic energy had entered the arena of international relations 

 the attitude changed from cooperation to secrecy. One early task of 

 U.S. diplomacy was to reconcile the nuclear interests of U.S. allies 

 with this legislative constraint upon international cooperation and 

 communication of information for nuclear energy. 



Initial Pessim ism To travel Nuclear Power 



Early postwar preoccupation with military use of nuclear energy 

 and initial pessimism as to the commercial utility of nuclear power 

 concentrated the impact of atomic energy upon American diplomacy. 

 With the rapid expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, particularly 

 after perfection of the hydrogen bomb, U.S. diplomats for many years 

 operated from a unique position of strength that offset the rapid post- 

 war reduction of the Nation's armed forces. 



That commercial nuclear power would soon be feasible seemed un- 

 likely in the late 1940's. A leading theoretician of nuclear power, Dr. 

 Walter Zinn, in draft ing the firsl program for nuclear power in 1947. 

 called attention to the shortage of nuclear fuel. Existing stocks of 

 uranium ores were judged scarcely large enough to sustain produc- 

 tion of a modes! number of weapons, but inadequate to supply fuel 

 for future nuclear power plants. Zinn concluded that the only hope 

 for nuclear power lay in successful perfection of the breeder. Trans- 



" Public Law 82 235, 05 Stat. 692. 



u The Act amended Section 10. (a) (3) it required unanimous action by the five ('mn- 

 ioners on such an agreement and provided further that certain Information about 

 weapons nut be communicated ; thai no such arrangement be entered into with any 

 nation "threatening the sccuritj of the United States"; thai the data involved ". . . shall 

 he limited ami circumscribed i" the maximum degree consistent with the common defense 

 ami Miu ri t y . . ." ; thai the Presidenl gel written recommendations of the National 

 Security Council ami incorporate these in a determination that the arrangement would 

 ". . . substantial]} promote ami would not endanger tin' common defense ami security of 

 the United States . . ami that before tin' arrangement was consummated, the Joint 



Committi i' "a Atomic Energj should be Informed ami thirtj days pass. 



