139 



the prospect of more efficient conversion of energy into electricity ; a 

 fusion powerplant would discharge less waste heat to the environ- 

 ment than its fission counterpart, thus easing problems of thermal 

 pollution. 



At least three major technical obstacles stand in the way of a demon- 

 stration of a workable controlled fusion reaction. Optimists expect 

 these can be overcome within the next few decades. On the other hand, 

 until a demonstration is actually achieved, national energy policies 

 cannot assume that fusion will in fact be available to supply energy 

 needs of the 21st century. 



Safeguards : Ways to Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diversion of 

 Fissionable Materials 



The nuclear age brought a new meaning to the word "safeguards" 

 in international relations. Safeguards are measures to guard against 

 the diversion of nuclear fuel material from uses permitted by law or 

 international agreement and to give timely indication of possible diver- 

 sion or assurance that diversion has not occurred. 10 Safeguards are a 

 means of detecting but not preventing diversion. 



Diversion of plutonium produced in nuclear power plants is con- 

 sidered to be the chief danger to national security from commercial 

 nuclear power. A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy is to dis- 

 courage nations which now lack nuclear weapons from building fa- 

 cilities to produce nuclear materials to make weapons. The expected 

 installation of nuclear power plants in many of these countries will 

 make available large amounts of plutonium with an attendant risk 

 of diversion. The Internationa] Atomic Energy Agency estimates that 

 by 1980 the daily accretion to the world's stock of nuclear fuel mate- 

 rials will be sufficient to manufacture 10 nuclear weapons a day. 11 



Some observers expect that from 300,000 to 450,000 kilograms of 

 plutonium will be accumulated by 1980 in civil nuclear power pro- 

 grams throughout the world. 12 As for slightly enriched uranium, while 

 it cannot be used directly in weapons, it could be further processed to 

 increase its enrichment to weapons grade. 



Fortunately for international security, the plutonium produced in 

 commercial operation of nuclear power plants is not ideal for use in 

 weapons. Nonetheless, it would be possible in principle to operate 

 some nuclear power plants to produce plutonium better suited for 

 weapons materials. "With present nuclear technology, this action would 

 require the plants involved to be shut down frequently, which would 

 be a conspicuous signal of suspicious behavior. 



All safeguards systems depend upon two elements: (1) the main- 

 tenance and review of records showing the receipt, production, con- 

 sumption, transfer, and storage of nuclear materials: and (2) the 

 undertaking of on-site inspections to determine the validity of these 

 records. Physical inspection is necessary- to verify the amount of safe- 

 guarded materials actually on hand. An inspector must have access 

 to the materials to take measurements and, in some cases, take samples 

 for analvsis. 



10 The Department of State used this definition in : U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on 

 Foreign Relations, Hearings, Xonprolifcratinn Treat;/. 90th Cong. 2d Sess., 196S, p. 50. 



11 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards, (circa 1968) p. 7. 



12 Mason Willrich. "The Nature of the Problem," in Mason Willrieh. ed., Civil Nuclear 

 Power and International Security (New York : Praeger Publishers, 19T1), p. 3. 



