116 



for the delay in the opening of recent negotiations on strategic arms 

 limitation has been Soviet reluctance to bargain until it had attained 

 "parity" with the United States in strategic weapons. 154 



A fuller appreciation of this Soviet attitude during the UNAEC 

 negotiations might have broadened the perspective of U.S. policy. 

 Moreover, if U.S. policymakers had been aware of the fact that the 

 Soviet Union had been working assiduously on its own atomic weapons 

 during the negotiations, a different approach might have been used. 

 Two cabinet members, Secretary Stimson, and the Secretary of Com- 

 merce, Henry Wallace, suggested that the Soviet Union be treated in a 

 more open manner on atomic energy questions. Stimson, who left the 

 Administration in September 1945, suggested including the Soviets in 

 atomic energy development as soon as possible after the war. Such a 

 move, he believed, would avert Soviet suspicions regarding U.S. inten- 

 tions and would mark a first step toward the necessary internationali- 

 zation of atomic energy, without giving rise to an arms race. During 

 the UNAEC negotiations, Wallace publicly encouraged more active 

 cooperation with the Soviet Union, to the point where his remarks be- 

 came a source of embarrassment to the Administration; to Baruch the 

 vigorous expression of the Wallace position was undermining the U.S. 

 position at the UNAEC. As a result, Truman asked Wallace to leave 

 his cabinet. Obviously, the suggestions of both Stimson and Wallace 

 fell on deaf ears of those in power, who felt it necessary to adopt a 

 defensive position toward the Soviet Union. 155 



One source declares that a major weakness of the U.S. policy on 

 atomic energy was its diplomatic timing. Details of U.S. policy on in- 

 ternational control remained unclear for a few months after the first 

 atomic weapon was used. And the approach to the Soviet Union at 

 the Moscow conference was made only after consultations with the 

 British and the Canadians, a move which one source sees as an indica- 

 tion to the Soviets of a conspiracy against them. 156 



Another issue in the negotiations which may have represented a po- 

 litical miscalculation by the United States concerned its policy on 

 eliminating the veto over sanctions. Bechhoefer concludes that U.S. 

 insistence on this provision gave the Soviets the wrong reason for 

 opposing the U.S. control plan, since it presented an issue which was 

 unrelated to the substantive problems of control. 157 In light of the way 

 U.S. policy on the veto developed just two years after the opening of 

 the UNAEC, the political impact of Baruch's attitude toward the veto 

 in atomic energy matters does not seem to have been noticed by other 

 policymakers at the time of the UNAEC meetings. Indeed, U.S. policy 

 toward the veto soon developed in such a way as to be inconsistent with 

 the position which Baruch was striving to maintain. The Vandenberg 

 resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate in July 1948, 158 recommended 



,M For example. Dr. Mnrshnll Shulman. Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia 

 University, recently testified to a Senate committee that "Perhaps one reason for the delay 

 in the Soviet response was the desire to wait until deployments then planned had made 

 their appearance, so thai negotiations could lie conducted on the hasis of equality." U.S. 

 Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter- 

 national Law and Organization. Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget. 

 Hearings, June and July, 1971, 92d Cong., first scss. (Washington, U.S. Government 

 Printing Office. l!»71 1. n 246. 



163 For detailed accounts of the positions taken by Stimson and Wallace, see Lleberman, 

 The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp. 138-155 and pp. 334-358, respectively. 



>'■" Ibid., p. in:, 



inT Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, pp. 59-60. 



«»For a complete texl o1 tin Vandenberg resolution, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Sub- 

 committee on the t " n i t <<t Nations Charter. Review <>f tin United Nations Charter, t Col- 

 lection of Documents. 83d Cong., Second scss., January 7, 1954. (Washington. U.S. 

 Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 140-141. 



