121 



On the whole, the technology of atomic energy seems to have deter- 

 mined the parameters of the proposals and therefore set the tone of the 

 negotiations. When obstacles arose in the policymaking process and in 

 the negotiations, the consensus was that there had been a failure to 

 recognize the technological factors which supported the proposal for 

 the international control system. Yet little effort was made by the 

 diplomats to come to terms with some of the political problems which 

 contributed significantly to the impasse. At the same time, scientists 

 who were in a position to influence policymakers in the United States 

 and in the UNA EC refused to accept any responsibility for comment- 

 ing on the political feasibility of control or the political elements of a 

 possible control system. 



Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and negotiators 

 alike was that the technological necessities of effective control would 

 force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the drive to devise 

 effectiveness in the control system seems to have ignored, if not to have 

 defied, the need for special diplomatic efforts to achieve acceptability. 



The area of acceptability received little if any consideration in U.S. 

 policy discussions. The basis for the U.S. approach may be found in 

 several considerations: a moralistic attitude which characterized the 

 U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance generated by the notion of U.S. 

 leverage, or prejudice toward Soviet science and technology which led 

 to overly hopeful estimates of the life expectancy of the U.S. monopoly 

 over atomic weapons. 



It is clear that while science and technology alone could devise a 

 control system which would be efficient in its task, and diplomacy 

 could provide the fundamentals for an acceptable system to protect 

 national security, only a combination of the elements from science, 

 technology, and diplomacy could be expected to devise a workable 

 system for control which would be acceptable to the leading nations 

 of the world. 



Underlying many of the conclusions on acceptability is an assump- 

 tion that all parties entered the UNAEC negotiations in good faith, 

 and were prepared to bargain diligently for a goal which represented 

 the promise of assured security for all. It would be virtually impossible, 

 of course, to determine accurately what were in fact the motives of 

 each country as it entered the negotiations. But it is reasonably certain 

 that the tone of the initial proposals could have helped shape the sub- 

 sequent behavior of the countries in the negotiations. As it was, the 

 initial proposals may have lessened the force of the drive which was 

 necessary to sustain the bargaining process successfully. 



In light of the fact that the Soviets were not far from developing 

 their own atomic weapon, one might infer alternatively that the So- 

 viets entered the negotiations simply for propaganda value and were 

 not genuinely interested in achieving a system of international con- 

 trol of atomic energy. Whether or not this was the case, not everything 

 possible was done by the West to create an atmosphere of trust or a 

 spirit of compromise which would seem to be basic ingredients to 

 meaningful negotiation. This fact could cast doubts on the intentions 

 of the West. On the whole, one cannot discount entirely the possibility 

 of some measure of reluctance on the part of both the United States 

 and the Soviet Union to accept the idea of international control of 

 atomic energy, a sentiment which would inevitably have influenced 

 their behavior in the negotiations. 



