218 



sole source of supply. For example, the EEC in its report for 1969, ob- 

 served that the setting up of a uranium enrichment facility in the 

 Community before 1980 would help to achieve an aim of the EEC, 

 namely, to assure secure supplies of enriched uranium at stable prices. 208 

 But reaching a policy decision to build an enrichment plant was not 

 easy for Euratom. The plant would require a large capital investment, 

 and a large supply of electricity, and might be uneconomical to operate 

 without subsidy should the United States decide to cut its prices for 

 enriching services. Complicating the decision for Euratom also were 

 the uncertain estimates for future use of nuclear power in Europe. 

 Forecasts of expansion in nuclear capacity ranged from 10,000 mega- 

 watts in 1970 — including the nuclear power plants of the United King- 

 dom — to 100,000 megawatts by 1980, and to perhaps twice this by 

 1985, 209 but these estimates were so qualified as to provide a shaky basis 

 for raising the necessary capital. 



SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SUPPLY AGENCY 



The monopoly of the Supply Agency was challenged by the French 

 and Italian Governments. In 1965 the Euratom Commission decided to 

 revise the charter of the Supply Agency. A now text Avas submitted to 

 the Euratom Council and to the European Parliament. But the Coun- 

 cil failed to agree and the revision was shelved. Five of Euratom's 

 member states regarded the previous Supply Agency's statute as 

 remaining in force, but France did not. Thereafter the French Govern- 

 ment entered into bilateral transactions with other countries and sup- 

 plied nuclear fuel materials directly to them as later did Italy, in seem- 

 ing violation of the Supply Agency's charter. 



The EEC Commission in October 1970 attempted to reassert the con- 

 trol of the Supply Agency. Reportedly, it sent an ultimatum to France 

 to respect the fuel supply provisions of the Treaty. Barring compli- 

 ance, the Commission would bring the alleged violations before the 

 EEC Court of Justice. The French countered with a proposal to end 

 the Agency's control over nuclear fuel arrangements except in time of 

 nuclear fuel scarcity. France was said to have West German support 

 for its position that EEC member states be permitted to contract inde- 

 pendently for their own nuclear fuel supplies. 210 



1 1 ere again is an example of the divisive forces of nationalism. 



SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIALS 



For nuclear power to help resolve Europe's energy problems with- 

 out, unacceptably increasing (lie risk of proliferation of nuclear 

 weapons, there had to be credible assurance that diversion of nuclear 

 fuel materials would be promptly detected. In assigning a safeguards 

 functions to Euratom, the Treaty of Rome made a notable innovation 



*» European Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities of the 

 Communities, 1969, op. pit., p. 253. 



** Uranium Resources, Production and Demand. A joint report by the European Nuclear 

 Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Ajrency (Paris: Organization for 

 Economic Cooperation and Development, September 1970) . p. 43. 



"o Nucleonics Week, vol. 11 (October 29, 1970), p. 6. The EEC Commission's ultimatum 

 followed a scries of alleged violations by France which Included loan of uranium to the 

 Italian government, cut-rate purchase of plutonlum from Canada, and failure to report 

 uranium prospecting and marketing plans. 



