219 



in international relations. By the Treaty, the Common Market nations 

 yielded some of their sovereignty to this multi-national, regional orga- 

 nization, and granted to Euratom supranational rights of inspection 

 and independent verification of holdings of nuclear fuel materials. 



The Treaty provided that the Euratom Commission — now the EEC 

 Commission — shall satisfy itself that in the territories of the member 

 states : 



(a) ores, source materials, and special fissionable materials are 

 not diverted from their intended uses as stated by the users; 



(b) the provisions concerning supplies and any special under- 

 taking concerning measures of control entered into by the Com- 

 munity in an agreement concluded with a third country or an 

 international organization are observed. 



This provision was to cause some difficulty for the United States, which 

 would have preferred to send its own inspectors into the Euratom 

 member states rather than rely upon Euratom's inspectors. 



Considering that safeguarding of nuclear materials was also to be 

 a function of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it woidd have 

 been logical when establishing Euratom to put this function within 

 the IAEA. However, at that time the Soviet Union opposed the 

 creation of Euratom and had used its influence within the IAEA to 

 prevent any cooperative relation between the two agencies. Thus, the 

 negotiators had no choice but to equip Euratom with its own safe- 

 guards function. 



The Treaty provided Euratom with plenary authority to carry out 

 safeguards. Any organization setting up or using facilities for the 

 production, separation, or use of nuclear materials, or for the process- 

 ing of used nuclear fuels, first has to declare to Euratom the technical 

 details of such facilities to the extent necessary for safeguards. Proce- 

 dures for the processing of used fuels are also subject to Euratom 

 approval. Records are to be kept to account for nuclear materials re- 

 ceived, used, produced, or sent out. In addition, Euratom requires that 

 any excess inventory of nuclear fuel materials be deposited with it, or 

 in a storage place controlled by it. 



A vital innovation of the Treaty is the right accorded Euratom to 

 send its inspectors into the territories of member states to verify the 

 accuracy of information reported to it. On presentation of their creden- 

 tials, these inspectors are to have access at all times to all places and 

 data and to any person to the extent necessary to "control ores, source 

 materials, and special fissionable materials and to satisfy themselves 

 concerning the observation of safeguards." Inspectors of Euratom are' 

 to be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned, if that 

 state so requests. 



Should a Euratom inspector be denied access, the matter would go 

 to the EEC Commission which could apply to the EEC Court of 

 Justice for a warrant to enforce the carrying out of the inspection. 

 If there is danger in delay, the Treaty authorizes Euratom itself to 

 issue a written order that the inspection be carried out. After serving 

 of such a warrant or decision, the national authorities of the state 

 concerned are expected ". . . to ensure access by the inspectors to the 

 places named in the warrant or decision." This power of Euratom has 

 yet to be tested in practice. 



