233 



by the United States. The U.S. negotiators sought the right to send 

 inspectors into nuclear facilities of Euratom member states. The 

 Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise was for Eura- 

 tom to establish a safeguard system for U.S.-supplied materials in 

 accordance with principles accepted by the United States, and to allow 

 U.S. assistance in establishing the sj^stem and to frequent consulta- 

 tions and visits. Both parties agreed to verification, by mutually 

 approved scientific methods, of the effectiveness of the safeguard and 

 control system. But the agreement was silent on inspection by U.S. 

 personnel. Euratom agreed in the bilateral agreement to consult with 

 the International Atomic Energy Agency to assure that its system 

 would be reasonably compatible with that of the IAEA. The agree- 

 ment also provided that should the International Agency establish 

 an international safeguard and control system, the United States 

 and Euratom would consult with the IAEA regarding its assump- 

 tion of these functions. 251 



With the IAEA now responsible for such a safeguards and control 

 system under the Nonproliferation Treaty, it will be interesting to 

 see how the Agency's functions will impact upon Euratom safeguards. 



The Joint Power Program 



The initial target of the joint power program was the construction 

 of six nuclear power plants in Europe with a combined electrical out- 

 put of 1,000 megawatts. These were to use U.S. nuclear technology. 

 The goal was partially achieved. By the time the joint power program 

 ended, three nuclear power plants with a combined output of 597 MW 

 had been built and put into operation, employing two different tech- 

 nological approaches. 



The joint program was put into motion by two invitations for pro- 

 posals. Some details of these invitations are pertinent as illustrations 

 of measures to promote foreign use of a new technologj^. 



THE FIRST INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE 



On April 13, 1959, Euratom and the U.S. Mission to Euratom in- 

 vited proposals from would-be contractors to build nuclear power 

 plants to be completed by the end of 1963, and to operate for at least 

 10 years. To attract the interest and participation of the conserva- 

 tive European electricity industry, the invitations offered five 

 inducements : 252 



(1) Financial guarantees for a 10-year operating period for 

 the cost of fabrication and the integrity of the nuclear fuel. 253 



(2) Long-term assurance of an adequate supply of nuclear fuel 

 at prices comparable to those offered to industry within the United 

 States. The U.S. agreed to furnish Euratom with up to 30,000 

 kilograms of U-235 on credit at 4 percent interest. 



(3) Assurance for 10 years of a defined market for the pluto- 

 nium recovered from the used fuel. 



811 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom 

 Agreement, op. cit., p. 9. 



262 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera- 

 tion with Euratom, op. cit., p. 21. 



™ During: the late 1950's the technology for fabrication of nuclear fuel was still evolving 

 rapidly and there was little experience to .indicate how well it would perform in practice, 

 or that estimated costs of fabrication could be held down. For these reasons, financial 

 guarantees to the electric utilities for cost of fabrication and minimum performance were 

 considered to be important incentives. 



